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THE NEW STOCK MARKET: SENSE AND 
NONSENSE 
MERRITT B. FOX,† LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN,††  
AND GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG††† 
ABSTRACT 
  How stocks are traded in the United States has been totally 
transformed. Gone are the dealers on NASDAQ and the specialists at 
the NYSE. Instead, a company’s stock can now be traded on up to 
sixty competing venues where a computer matches incoming orders. 
High-frequency traders (HFTs) post the majority of quotes and are 
the preponderant source of liquidity in the new market. 
  Many practices associated with the new stock market are highly 
controversial, as illustrated by the public furor following the 
publication of Michael Lewis’s book Flash Boys. Critics say that 
HFTs use their speed in discovering changes in the market and in 
altering their orders to take advantage of other traders. Dark pools—
off-exchange trading venues that promise to keep the orders sent to 
them secret and to restrict the parties allowed to trade—are accused of 
operating in ways that injure many traders. Brokers are said to 
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mishandle customer orders in an effort to maximize the payments 
they receive for sending trading venues their customers’ orders, rather 
than delivering best execution. 
  In this Article, we set out a simple, but powerful, conceptual 
framework for analyzing the new stock market. The framework is 
built upon three basic concepts: adverse selection, the principal-agent 
problem, and a multivenue trading system. We illustrate the utility of 
this framework by analyzing the new market’s eight most 
controversial practices. The effects of each practice are evaluated in 
terms of the multiple social goals served by equity-trading markets. 
  We ultimately conclude that there is no emergency requiring 
immediate, poorly considered action. Some reforms proposed by 
critics, however, are clearly desirable. Other proposed reforms 
involve a trade-off between two or more valuable social goals. In 
these cases, whether a reform is desirable may be unclear, but a better 
understanding of the trade-off involved enables a more informed 
choice and suggests areas in which further empirical research would 
be useful. Finally, still other proposed reforms are based on 
misunderstandings of the market or of the social impacts of a practice 
and should be avoided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The United States stock market, the most iconic market in 
global capitalism, is rigged.”1 With this provocative statement on 60 
Minutes, Michael Lewis, best-selling author of Flash Boys: A Wall 
Street Revolt,2 brought to the forefront of public consciousness a 
growing controversy concerning the way stocks are traded in the 
United States. Such trading has been totally transformed over the last 
twenty years. A truly new stock market has developed and not 
everyone is pleased with the results. This Article addresses these 
dissatisfactions and, in doing so, develops a framework for analyzing 
more generally the wide variety of policy issues to which the new 
stock market has given rise. 
The various actors whose interactions make up the new stock 
market have come in for tremendous scrutiny. Particularly sharp 
criticism has been aimed at high-frequency traders (HFTs), which are 
said to use their speed in finding out changes in the market and in 
altering their own orders to take advantage of other traders in the 
market.3 HFTs are believed now to participate in about half of all 
 
 1. 60 Minutes: Rigged (CBS television broadcast Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/is-the-us-stock-market-rigged [http://perma.cc/7HEF-GXRM]. 
 2. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). 
 3. Charles Schwab, founder of the well-known brokerage firm bearing his name, recently 
suggested, for example, that “[h]igh-frequency traders are gaming the system, reaping billions in 
the process and undermining investor confidence in the fairness of the markets . . . . It’s a 
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trades.4 Other features of the new stock market have been the subject 
of attack as well. “Dark pools” are off-exchange trading venues that 
promise to keep secret the existence of the orders sent to them and to 
restrict the kinds of parties allowed to trade.5 Dark pools are said to 
often break these promises, to the disadvantage of traders sending 
orders to these venues.6 A trader is also hurt if her broker fails to send 
her order to the trading venue where it will execute at the best price 
or in the most timely and reliable fashion. Critics suggest that brokers 
often fail in this way, sending the order instead to the venue that pays 
the most to the broker through practices such as “payment for order 
flow” or “maker fees.”7 Polls now indicate that “roughly two-thirds of 
Americans believe the stock market unfairly benefits some at the 
expense of others,”8 a belief that some commentators think explains 
what has been a sharp drop in the percentage of Americans directly 
or indirectly owning equities.9 
 
growing cancer and needs to be addressed.” Steven Russolillo, Schwab on HFT: ‘Growing 
Cancer’ That Must Be Addressed, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/04/03/schwab-on-hft-growing-cancer-that-must-be-addressed 
[http://perma.cc/T5JE-MK7T]. These practices, and criticisms of them, are discussed in more 
detail in Parts V.A, V.B, and V.C.  
 4. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part V.E. 
 6. Sam Mamudi, UBS Hit With Record Dark Pool Fine for Breaking U.S. Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-15/sec-fines-
ubs-dark-pool-more-than-14-million-for-breaking-rules.html [http://perma.cc/Y53P-G7MC] 
(imposing on UBS the largest fine ever given a dark pool operator); Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools 
Opening Up Amid Increased Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (May 21, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-21/dark-pools-opening-up-amid-increased-
scrutiny [http://perma.cc/9XRT-QEG7] (reporting on industry unease with dark pools). These 
practices, and the criticisms of them, are discussed in more detail in Part V.E. 
 7. See, e.g., William Alden, At Senate Hearing, Brokerage Firms Called Out for Conflicts, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 17, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/
trader-who-called-markets-rigged-tempers-his-critique [http://perma.cc/BLA3-3FC6] (discussing 
scrutiny of payment for order flow at recent Congressional hearings); Editorial, The Hidden 
Cost of Trading Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion
/best-execution-and-rebates-for-brokers.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/C7TJ-ZGQU] (criticizing 
the practice of maker-taker fees). These practices, and the criticisms of them, are discussed in 
more detail in Parts V.F and V.G. 
 8. Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock 
Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) 
[hereinafter High Speed Trading Hearings]. 
 9. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx [http://perma.cc/8H
KC-DBPS] (indicating that in 2013, stock ownership among U.S. adults was at its lowest level 
since 1998). Lewis attributes this drop, which has occurred in the face of a sharply rising market 
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Actors in the nation’s legal, regulatory, and political arenas have 
reacted rapidly to the growing furor over the new stock market. The 
U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission have all confirmed investigations into 
HFTs.10 Plaintiffs’ class-action lawyers have filed several civil lawsuits 
based on various controversial market practices.11 The New York 
Attorney General has brought a high-profile lawsuit against the 
major investment bank Barclays, alleging it misrepresented to 
investors the extent to which its dark pool was free of HFT activity.12 
Several Congressional hearings have been held,13 after which U.S. 
Senator Carl Levin wrote to Mary Jo White, the Chair of the SEC, 
 
over the last five years, to a sense that the market is unfair. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 200–01; see 
also Editorial, supra note 7 (“There’s no escaping the conclusion that the stock market is not a 
level playing field where all investors, large and small, have an equal shot at a fair deal.”). 
 10. See Keri Geiger & Patricia Hurtado, FBI Seeks Help From High-Frequency Traders to 
Find Abuses, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-
31/fbi-said-to-probe-high-speed-traders-over-abuse-of-information.html [http://perma.cc/WQ67-
NMH4]; Sarah N. Lynch & Karen Freifeld, SEC Chair Discusses Probes into High-Speed 
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-
congress-sec-highspeed-idUSBREA301RC20140401 [http://perma.cc/4N7G-UCRN]; Douwe 
Miedema, U.S. Futures Regulator CFTC Probing Speed Traders, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2014, 3:13 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-hedgefunds-speed-trading-cftc-idUSBREA
321QU20140403 [http://perma.cc/Z4SE-MZL3]; Del Quentin Wilber, Keri Geiger & Patricia 
Hurtado, Holder Vows High-Speed Trading Probe to Protect Markets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 
2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/holder-vows-high-speed-trading-
probe-to-protect-markets.html [http://perma.cc/A9JC-6HW9] (DOJ).  
 11. See Amended Complaint at 1 n.1, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 
14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014) (alleging securities fraud in a class action against every 
major stock exchange); Complaint at 10, Flynn v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 14-cv-4321-JMF 
(S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2014) (alleging manipulation of securities markets by HFTs); Complaint at 
4–5, Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., No. 14-cv-3745-KBF (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (alleging breach 
of contract based on trading venues’ differential sale-of-information access to HFTs and other 
users); Complaint at 3–4, Harel Ins. v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-3608-UA (S.D.N.Y. 
May 20, 2014) (alleging that trading venues provided HFTs material non-public information in 
return for kickbacks). CME Group Inc., which owns the world’s largest futures market, has 
been sued by users accusing it of catering to HFTs. See Complaint at 1, Braman v. CME Group, 
Inc., No. 14-cv-2646 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2014). 
 12. Complaint at 2–4, Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital, Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. June 25, 2014). 
 13. See, e.g., High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8; High Frequency Trading’s Impact 
on the Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014); Oversight of the SEC’s Division of 
Trading and Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored 
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 113th Cong. (2014); The Role of Regulation in Shaping 
Equity Market Structure and Electronic Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Role of Regulation Hearings]. 
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demanding significant changes to market structure and the 
elimination of “[c]onflicts of interest [that] erode public confidence in 
the markets.”14 
It is time to step back and take a serious, dispassionate look at 
how the new stock market functions and the implications of the 
regulatory choices we face going forward. Legal scholars have done 
an able job of applying the insights of many economic theories to law. 
This has not been true, however, of the now well-established field of 
microstructure economics. Its foundational models of trading 
behavior in financial markets are rarely cited in legal scholarship and 
never discussed in depth.15 The literature of the field itself, although 
empirically sophisticated, lacks a broad-scope, institutionally nuanced 
look at the basic dynamics shaping the modern equities market. Thus, 
we still lack a comprehensive framework for understanding the new 
stock market. The absence of such a framework acts as a serious 
obstacle for legislators, regulators, judges, and the public in deciding 
how to seriously think about regulating our markets. Much is at stake. 
The performance of the equities market has important effects on the 
efficiency with which goods and services are produced in our 
economy and on the real economy’s rate of growth. Equities also play 
a vital role as a place for ordinary individuals to invest their savings. 
This Article brings the insights of microstructure economics to bear to 
provide a comprehensive framework for thinking about the new stock 
market. We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework by 
applying it to the new market’s most controversial practices. 
Although these practices may seem completely unrelated to each 
other, they can all be understood through just three basic 
mechanisms: adverse selection, the principal-agent problem, and a 
multivenue trading system.16 
We ultimately conclude that no emergency exists requiring 
immediate, less-than-fully-considered action. Some reforms proposed 
 
 14. Letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/levin-letter-to-sec-chairman-mary-jo-white-re-equity-
market-structure-july-15_2014 [http://perma.cc/WBK5-G56C]. 
 15. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (providing 
model of trading behavior under information asymmetries in securities markets); Albert S. 
Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985) (providing 
model of trading behavior under information asymmetries in securities markets). The seminal 
models of Glosten-Milgrom and Kyle have been cited far less than 100 times in any publication 
covered by Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database. 
 16. See infra Parts I.D, III. 
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by critics, however, appear after analysis, to be unambiguously 
desirable. We conclude, for example, that it would be good to require 
brokers to pass through maker-taker fees and payment for order flow 
to their customers. Other proposed reforms involve a trade-off in 
which an improvement in terms of one worthwhile social goal can 
only come at a sacrifice of another such goal. In these cases, it may 
not be obvious whether a reform is, or is not, desirable, but a better 
understanding of the trade-off involved makes for a more informed 
choice and may point to areas in which further empirical research 
would be useful. We find this to be the case with, for example, 
proposals to briefly delay providing HFTs with information 
concerning new transactions and quotation changes so that HFTs 
have no advantages over other traders. Finally, still other proposed 
reforms are bad ideas that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of 
how the market really works or of the actual social impact of a given 
practice. We find this to be the case with, for example, proposals that 
HFTs must keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of 
time and proposals aimed at generally discouraging, or even banning, 
trading on dark pools. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses briefly how the 
stock market has changed, the eight controversial practices we will 
analyze, and the analytic framework that will guide that analysis. Part 
II specifies some basic vocabulary; illustrates how, in a multivenue 
market, the arrival of a market order, the arrival of a limit order, and 
the cancellation of an already standing limit order each results in a 
transaction and/or changes the available quotes; and describes how 
information concerning the quotes and transactions on these venues 
is collected and disseminated. Part III considers the economics of 
liquidity supply in the presence of adverse selection, explaining how 
the most complex and important of our three factors operates. 
Part IV sets out the normative criteria for evaluating the social 
impact of a practice or reform. Part V applies our analytic framework 
by analyzing each of the new stock market’s eight most controversial 
practices and assessing the ultimate impact of each on the multiple 
social goals discussed in Part IV. This grand tour of current 
controversies also serves as an illustration of how the simple analytic 
framework described above can provide the key to understanding the 
new stock market more generally. Part VI contains our 
recommendations, after which we conclude. 
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I.  THE NEW STOCK MARKET: CHANGES, CONTROVERSIES, AND 
APPROACH 
It is important at the outset to see how much the stock market 
has changed in a relatively short time and to identify the forces that 
have led to this change. It is useful as well to specify in more detail 
the most controversial practices associated with the new stock market 
and to lay out the basics of our approach to these practices and the 
operations of the new market. 
A. How the Stock Market Has Changed 
The stock market is an institution that connects potential buyers 
and sellers of companies’ stocks. As recently as the early 1990s, 
trading in the stock of each publicly traded company of any 
significance was still largely confined to a single venue, either 
NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).17 At 
NASDAQ, a dealer was the purchaser of every share sold by a trader 
and the seller of every share bought by a trader. The dealer did so at 
quoted prices generated through the calculation and judgment of an 
individual human being. At the NYSE, where there was an actual 
floor, the specialist for a stock, also a human being, often played a 
similar dealer role, but in addition posted quotes sent in by traders 
willing to buy or sell at stated prices, held auctions, and helped 
arrange trades by brokers and traders on the floor.18 
Today, any given stock is potentially traded in each of almost 
sixty competing venues: eleven exchanges and almost fifty dark 
pools.19 The NASDAQ dealers and the NYSE specialists are gone. 
Almost all of these competing trading venues are electronic limit 
order books, in which a trader can post a limit order, which is its firm 
commitment until cancelled, to buy or sell up to a specified number of 
shares at a quoted price.20 A computer (the venue’s matching engine) 
 
 17. See generally George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and 
Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217, 225–27 (2005) (explaining the history of NYSE 
and NASDAQ procedures). 
 18. See LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE 
FOR PRACTITIONERS 89–111 (2003) (discussing the structure of the traditional NYSE and 
NASDAQ exchanges). 
 19. LAURA TUTTLE, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS: DESCRIPTION OF ATS TRADING 
IN NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 5–6 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/
research/ats_data_paper_october_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8J3D-JVBZ].  
 20. See infra Part II.A. For a posted sell limit order, this stated limit price is an “offer.” For 
a posted buy limit order, this stated limit price is a “bid.” 
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matches these posted limit orders with incoming buy and sell market 
orders, which are orders from traders willing to trade at whatever is 
the best available price in the market.21 
Today, HFTs post a majority of the limit orders that are matched 
in this fashion and result in executed trades.22 An HFT uses high-
speed communications to constantly update its information 
concerning transactions occurring in each stock that it regularly 
trades, as well as changes in the buy and sell limit orders posted by 
others on every major trading venue. This information is 
automatically fed into a computer that uses algorithms to change the 
limit prices and quantities associated with the HFT’s own limit orders 
posted on each of the various trading venues.23 More than three-
quarters of all trades in the United States are executed on one or 
another of these electronic limit order book venues.24 Most of the 
remaining trades involve a broker internally matching the buy and 
sell orders received from retail customers.25 
B. Forces for Change and the Role of Regulation 
This transformation to the new stock market is a product of the 
fantastic increases in the speed of communication and calculation that 
have arisen from the information-technology revolution. The new 
stock market’s particular structure, though, is due in important part to 
choices made by Congress and the SEC. The initial impetus for this 
new market structure goes back to Congress’s adoption in 1975 of the 
National Market System (NMS) amendments to the Securities 
 
 21. The computer will also match the limit orders posted on the venue with “marketable 
limit orders.” A buy limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price greater than or equal 
to the lowest offer in the market and a sell limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price 
less than or equal to the highest bid. See infra Part II.A.  
 22. See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and its Impact on Market Quality 
2, 11 (July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/
HFT_Trading.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KCG-JVC4] (finding based on NASDAQ data set that 
HFTs supply liquidity for 51 percent of all trades and provide the market quotes 50 percent of 
the time); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New-Market 
Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712 (2013) (exploring the role of HFTs as market makers in today’s 
market).  
 23. See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 523, 540 (2014) (defining attributes of HFTs). 
 24. LAURA TUTTLE, OTC TRADING: DESCRIPTION OF NON-ATS OTC TRADING IN 
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 11 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/
otc_trading_march_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/VP6V-T6KV].  
 25. For a discussion of internalization, see infra Parts I.C.8, V.G, and VI.D. 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).26 Multiple, competing 
trading venues have the upside of the greater efficiency and higher 
rate of innovation that are likely to arise from competition. They have 
the possible downside that orders from potential traders are 
fragmented among multiple venues, which makes it less likely that 
willing buyers and sellers can easily find each other and transact. 
Congress, in its adoption of the NMS amendments, foresaw that 
improving information technology could significantly reduce this 
downside by making it easier for traders to see what is going on in 
each of these venues.27 The NMS amendments pushed the system to 
develop in this direction, a push that has been consistently supported 
by the SEC.28 
This decision favoring multiple venues is unlikely to be reversed 
in the foreseeable future. Data concerning the speed of trading, its 
cost, and the apparent amount of liquidity in the system suggest that 
the new stock market is a substantial improvement over what came 
before it.29 Today’s technology, if it instead were operating within a 
 
 26. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). 
 27. Alexander P. Okuliar, Financial Exchange Consolidation and Antitrust: Is There A 
Need for More Intervention?, 28 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2014, at 66, 67 (explaining changes 
implemented by the SEC to satisfy Congress’s vision for Regulation NMS). 
 28. Congress, when the NMS amendments were adopted, expected a proliferation of 
competing venues. It self-consciously rejected a proposal for an electronic limit order book in 
which all order flow was directed to a single trading venue, known as a central limit order book 
(CLOB). See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 12 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 190 
(rejecting the role for “the SEC . . . as an ‘economic czar’ for the development of a national 
market system” and noting that “a fundamental premise of the bill is that . . . a national market 
system . . . will depend upon the vigor of competition within the securities industry”); DIV. OF 
MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF 
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS app. III at 6 (1994) (discussing vigorous industry 
opposition to the SEC’s proposal of a CLOB in the 1970s); see also Milton H. Cohen, The 
National Market System—A Modest Proposal, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 774 (1978) (“But to 
accord ultimate and total benefit of the auction process to all orders is impossible unless that 
process is concentrated in one location (which Congress certainly did not set as a goal of the 
national market system) . . . .”); Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Limit Order Book 
Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127, 1129 (1994) (discussing mechanics of a CLOB); Craig Pirrong, The 
Thirty Years War, 28 REGULATION, no. 2, Summer 2005, at 54, 56 (explaining that a CLOB 
would effectively function as a public utility and the problems attendant to that status). 
 29. See JAMES J. ANGEL, LAWRENCE E. HARRIS & CHESTER S. SPATT, EQUITY TRADING 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN UPDATE 11–12 (2013), http://www.q-group.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Equity-Trading-in-the-21st-Century-An-Update-FINAL1.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2Q7-
CV3X] (showing significant increases in the speed of execution, decreases in the bid-ask spread, 
decreases in commissions, and increases in the number of quotes per minute); see also James J. 
Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st Century 7–26 
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centralized single-venue system, might of course have led to even 
greater improvements—a possibility that is the subject of continuing 
debate among academic theorists30—but this is entirely a matter of 
speculation. Moreover, as a matter of political economy, any attempt 
to reverse the decision for multiple venues would meet stiff resistance 
from those who have built businesses based on an assumption that the 
multivenue structure will continue. So, to the extent that the 
criticisms of the new stock market have merit, the challenge will be to 
design reforms within the current multivenue system. 
C. The Eight Most Controversial Practices 
Eight practices said to occur within the new stock market have 
attracted particular controversy. Although they will be analyzed in 
detail in Parts V and VI of this Article, it is helpful to introduce them 
at this point, using, in each case, a simple example. 
Note at the outset that each of the first three of these practices 
involves an HFT benefiting itself by taking advantage of having a “co-
location” facility at each exchange. Co-location involves the HFT 
having a computer located right next to an exchange’s matching 
engine. This arrangement allows the HFT to find out about 
transactions occurring on the exchange, and changes in quoted prices, 
sooner than other traders. It also allows the HFT to cancel old limit 
orders posted on the exchange, and submit new ones, very quickly. 
The HFT’s co-location facility at each exchange is connected to its co-
location facility at every other exchange by specialized fiber-optic 
cables, which permit extremely rapid communication among the 
HFT’s co-location facilities at the different exchanges, all of which 
have their matching engines in northern New Jersey. 
 
(Marshall Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. FBE 09-10, 2010), http://modernmarkets
initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Equity-Trading-in-the-21st-Century.pdf [http://perma.
cc/5J9P-Y796] (discussing recent technology improvements in trading systems and their 
impacts). 
 30. See generally, e.g., Jean-Edouard Colliard & Thierry Foucault, Trading Fees and 
Efficiency in Limit Order Markets, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3389 (2012) (discussing the drawbacks of 
a decentralized trading system when compared with a hypothetical single system); Thierry 
Foucault & Albert J. Menkveld, Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order Routing Systems, 
63 J. FIN. 119 (2008) (exploring the effects of market fragmentation on Euronext and the 
London Stock Exchange); see also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,530 (June 29, 2005) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (announcing the adoption of rules governing the 
dissemination of market data); Pirrong, supra note 28, at 54 (discussing Regulation NMS). 
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1. HFT electronic front running.  Suppose an institutional 
investor wishes to buy a very large number of shares of a given stock. 
The investor breaks the desired quantity into several smaller, but still 
sizable, marketable orders, each going to a different exchange. 
Through its co-location facility, an HFT learns of the transaction at 
the exchange that is reached first by the investor’s orders. The HFT’s 
algorithm infers from this information that, quite possibly, similar 
sizable orders are en route to other exchanges as well. The algorithm 
instantly sends out signals to make advantageous adjustments in the 
HFT’s limit orders posted on these other exchanges, adjustments that 
are completed within the tiny interval before the institution’s orders 
reach these other exchanges. Critics of the practice point to the fact 
that the institutional investor pays more for its shares than if these 
adjustments had not been made, while the HFT, using its information 
advantage, is benefited.31 
2. HFT slow-market arbitrage.  Suppose that on another day, the 
same HFT has posted on one exchange buy and sell limit orders that 
respectively represent the highest bid and lowest offer prices 
available on any exchange in the market for a particular stock. The 
HFT’s bid and offer are reported as such on the national system for 
reporting what, across all the exchanges, is the best available bid and 
offer for the stock. Then, an institutional investor, wishing to sell a 
substantial quantity of this stock, posts a new limit offer on a second 
exchange that is lower in price than the HFT’s offer. Through the 
HFT’s co-location facilities at the second exchange, the HFT almost 
instantaneously observes the arrival of this new better offer. There is 
a short period of time before the national reporting system reflects 
this new better offer, during which lag the HFT has the possibility of 
making a certain profit. The HFT leaves standing its offer on the first 
exchange. During the reporting lag, this offer continues to appear to 
the market, based on the national reporting system, to be the lowest-
price offer available. If a market buy order arrives at this first 
exchange before the national reporting system reflects the new better 
offer on the second exchange, the market order will execute against 
the HFT’s offer on the first market at the higher price. The HFT can 
then repurchase the same quantity of shares on the second exchange 
at the lower price being offered by the institutional investor, thereby 
making the HFT a certain profit. Critics point out trading is a zero-
 
 31. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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sum game and so the HFT’s profit comes at the expense of the other 
traders in the market.32 
3. HFT exploitation of midpoint orders sitting in dark pools.  On 
yet another day, suppose an institutional trader posts a midpoint limit 
buy order in a dark pool. This is an order that, until cancelled, will 
execute against any market sell order that subsequently arrives at the 
dark pool and will do so at a price equal to what, at the moment of 
execution, is the midpoint between the best offer and best bid 
reported to be available on any of the exchanges by the national 
reporting system. The HFT from our previous examples very rapidly 
observes, through its co-location facilities, that the quotes have 
changed on one exchange such that the new best offer on that 
exchange is lower than the midpoint between what, until that 
moment, had been the best bid and best offer available on any public 
exchange. Again, for a short period of time, the national reporting 
system will not reflect the new better offer that has already been 
observed by the HFT. The HFT purchases shares at the new better 
price and then immediately sends a sell order to the dark pool, which 
executes against the trader’s order at the midpoint between the still-
official, but now-stale, best offer and best bid reported by the national 
system. Because the price paid for the shares by the HFT on the 
exchange is lower than the price at which they are sold to the trader 
in the dark pool, the HFT makes a profit. Critics point out again that 
this profit comes at the expense of the other traders in the market.33 
4. HFT activities leading to increased volatility and crashes.  In the 
same period that the new stock market was emerging, with the large 
role played by HFTs, there was an upsurge in the volatility of share 
prices. The new market has also had a number of brief crashes and 
breakdowns in trading, which have been attributed to HFT 
algorithms receiving market information that leads the HFTs to 
suddenly exit the market.34 
5. Large investment banks in their role as brokers steering orders 
to their own dark pools.  An institutional investor uses a large 
investment bank as its broker to handle a buy limit order and the 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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bank steers the institution’s order to a dark pool that the bank 
operates. The bank’s proprietary traders learn through an internal 
source of the existence of the institution’s order. Unless cancelled, 
this order may sit in the dark pool until such time that the bank’s 
proprietary traders decide it is advantageous for them to send in an 
order to execute against the institution’s limit order (which would 
mean the execution is disadvantageous for the institutional investor). 
6. Large investment banks in their role as brokers ignoring 
customer directions to send orders to a specified venue.  Suppose the 
institution using this investment bank as a broker fears its order will 
be sent to the bank’s dark pool and suffer the fate described above. 
The institution therefore specifies that its order be sent to an 
alternative venue. The bank ignores the direction and sends the order 
to its own dark pool anyway. Even if the trader detects that this has 
happened, which may be difficult to do, it may not switch brokers 
because it may feel tied to the large bank due to the free “soft 
money” research services the bank provides.35 Market solutions to this 
large investment bank’s violation of its duty to provide best execution 
for its customer may not work effectively under these circumstances. 
7. Venue “maker-taker” and “taker-maker” fees paid to brokers.  
It is common for an exchange to make payments to brokers to prompt 
the brokers to steer certain kinds of orders in its direction and charge 
brokers for other kinds of orders they send to the exchange. Under 
the “maker-taker” model, the exchange pays for certain limit orders it 
receives that are ultimately executed and charges for each marketable 
order it receives that executes immediately against the limit orders 
posted on it. Under the “taker-maker” model, the venue does the 
opposite. Critics characterize each of these arrangements as a system 
of bribes. The critics argue they create incentives for brokers to direct 
 
 35. “Soft money” research consists of ancillary services provided to an institutional 
investor by a broker free of direct charge (that is, “hard money”) in return for that investor 
directing order flow to that broker. Soft-money arrangements can be desirable from an 
institutional investor’s perspective because it passes the cost of the soft-money research on to 
the client (in the form of inferior or costlier execution by the broker), rather than as part of the 
direct cost of the institutional investor’s own services to clients. See OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, 
INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE 
SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND MUTUAL 
FUNDS 6 (1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm [http://perma.cc/2AL3-5CVN]. 
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customer orders to the venue that pays the highest rebate, rather than 
the one that delivers best execution for the customer.36 
8. Payment for order flow.  For a fee, a brokerage firm may sell 
to another firm (an “order-execution facility”) its full order flow of 
buy and sell market orders from a certain kind of customer, typically 
retail investors, who are considered “uninformed.” The other firm 
promises to execute each purchased order at a price that is at least 
slightly improved over the best offer or bid available in the market at 
the time the order is placed. Selling order flow in this fashion 
essentially outsources what a large retail broker might otherwise do 
internally. This would be matching nearly simultaneous buy and sell 
orders, buying from the seller at a price slightly over the best bid in 
the market and selling to the buyer at a price slightly below the best 
offer in the market, and making the difference between the price paid 
and the price received as a profit. Critics characterize payment for 
order flow as another kind of bribe. They argue it creates an incentive 
for the broker to direct their customer orders to the venue that pays 
the highest rebate, rather than the one that most improves the prices 
sellers receive and buyers pay.37 
D. The Analytic Framework 
Most of the criticism of the new stock market simply consists of 
taking a representative single transaction involving one of these eight 
practices, showing the transaction benefits one party at the expense of 
another, and labeling the resulting transfer as “larcenous,” 
“extractive,” “predatory,” or simply “unfair.”38 
Serious analysis requires digging deeper. There needs to be a 
consideration of the effects of each of these practices as something 
that occurs on a repeated basis among competing actors, taking into 
account the reaction of the various other participants in the market to 
their knowledge that the practice is transpiring. Additionally, these 
effects need to be evaluated in terms of their ultimate impact on the 
multiple social goals—the evaluative criteria discussed in detail in 
Part IV—that equity-trading markets are expected to serve and that 
form the justificatory basis for regulation when the markets fall short. 
 
 36. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 38. See, e.g., infra notes 96, 108 and accompanying text. 
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Our analytic framework for undertaking this analysis has a 
surprisingly simple foundation. Though each of the eight most 
controversial practices seems highly distinct, they can all be 
understood by reference to just three basic concepts: 
Adverse selection. Markets benefit enormously from businesses 
that compete to post limit orders on venues against which marketable 
orders can transact, because the availability of these limit orders 
substantially increases liquidity. These businesses are referred to as 
“liquidity providers” or “market makers.” A professional supplier of 
liquidity for an issuer’s shares—today, typically an HFT—engages in 
both the frequent purchase and frequent sale of these shares. The 
liquidity supplier makes money if on average it sells the shares it buys 
for more than the price it paid. Its biggest problem is adverse 
selection: the possibility that the person who anonymously places an 
order that executes against the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so 
because the trader has private information about a stock’s value, 
which is not known to most of the market or to the liquidity supplier. 
In such a situation, the liquidity supplier will on average lose money 
on the trade. To survive in a competitive market, the liquidity 
supplier must set its bid and offer quotes—the limits on the purchase 
and sell orders it posts on trading venues—aggressively enough to 
attract business, but not so aggressively that the money it makes from 
buying from, and selling to, uninformed traders is less than what it 
loses from engaging in such transactions with informed traders. 
Liquidity providers, to minimize adverse selection, work to identify 
which orders come from informed traders. Informed traders, in turn, 
work to prevent their orders from being so identified. 
Principal-agent problems. Most traders are not allowed to send 
their orders directly to a trading venue due to the need to ensure that 
contracts involving the exchange of securities for cash are reliably 
completed. Instead, they must use a broker. The broker needs to be 
given a certain amount of discretion to be able to handle the order of 
the trader. Principal-agent problems arise because it is impossible to 
design a contract that cost-effectively assures that the broker (the 
agent) will act in the best interests of the trader (the principal).39 
Multiple venues. As discussed above, Congress and the SEC 
consciously chose to encourage the development of multiple 
 
 39. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) 
(providing the canonical model of a principal-agent problem). 
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competing venues for the trading of any given issuer’s stock, rather 
than one centralized trading venue. Each of the eight most 
controversial practices is related, in one way or another, to some 
aspect of the system that arises from this fundamental policy choice. 
The fact that the adverse-selection-driven cat-and-mouse game 
between liquidity suppliers and informed traders occurs within a 
world with multiple trading venues, combined with rapid advances in 
information technology, explains the new stock market’s 
extraordinary complexity and is key to understanding the social 
consequences of many of its most criticized practices. This 
complexity, in turn, has created new scope for principal-agent 
problems between brokers and traders. Although the new stock 
market feels bewildering, the central claim of this Article is that by 
understanding how these three factors interact in a competitive 
environment, a reader can understand most of what is happening. 
II.  PRIMER ON THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW STOCK MARKET 
In order to evaluate the critiques of the new stock market and 
consider what reforms might be warranted, understanding the 
mechanics of this market is important. Readers well versed in these 
mechanics should skip this discussion and move on to Part III. 
A. Vocabulary 
Before tackling the plumbing of an electronic-limit-order-based 
market, it is worthwhile to specify in more detail some vocabulary 
that helps to describe both what traders are seeking to accomplish 
with the orders they send to trading venues and the services that 
trading venues offer these traders. 
1. Quotes and depth.  Suppose at 1:59:32 PM on July 10, 2014, 
Maria decides she wants to buy 200 shares of Apple. She contacts her 
broker and discovers the best quotes for Apple: the national best bid 
(NBB) is $95.28 and the national best offer (NBO) is $95.29, with a 
depth, respectively, of 500 and 1,000 shares. In other words, according 
to the national reporting system, on one or more trading venues, 
there are one or more buyers willing to pay $95.28 per share for up to 
500 shares in aggregate (but no one willing to pay more) and one or 
more sellers willing to provide up to 1,000 shares in aggregate for 
$95.29 (but no one willing to charge less). 
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2. Market orders, marketable limit orders, and marketable orders.  
One possibility is that Maria submits a market buy order for 200 
shares, that is, an unconditional order to buy at whatever is the best 
(that is, lowest) price available. Because she places no limit on what 
she is willing to pay, the order will execute almost immediately. It will 
do so at $95.29 unless the NBO, as reported by the national reporting 
system, has changed by the time her order arrives at the trading 
venue to which it is ultimately sent.40 If the NBO has changed by that 
time, the order would execute at the new NBO. 
Another possibility is that Maria, knowing the current quotes, 
but wanting to protect herself in case the NBO moves up too much 
before her order can execute, places the order for 200 shares but with 
the caveat that she will not pay more than $95.31. In other words, 
Maria has submitted a limit buy order for 200 shares at $95.31.41 
Given that the NBO at the time Maria sent the order, $95.29, is 
below—that is, at least as favorable as—Maria’s $95.31 limit, we refer 
to her order as a marketable buy limit order.42 This is because it will 
behave just like a market order and execute at whatever is the then-
current NBO unless the NBO has changed and has moved to above 
$95.31 in the brief time it takes her order to arrive at the trading 
venue to which it is ultimately sent.43 For this reason, we call both 
market orders and marketable limit orders marketable orders. 
3. Nonmarketable limit orders.  In contrast, a nonmarketable buy 
limit order is a buy limit order with a price limit below the NBO at the 
time it is sent. It is called nonmarketable because at that moment, no 
one in the market is willing to sell at a price this low. Similarly, a 
 
 40. If there are at least 200 shares available at $95.29 at the venue to which Maria’s broker 
sends the order, the order will execute on this venue. If not, NMS Rule 611 requires that the 
venue have procedures in place to send all, or the unsatisfied part, of the order on to another 
venue where shares are available at the NBO of $95.29. See infra Part II.C. A market sell order 
would work the same way if she instead wished to sell 200 shares, and, unless the NBB changed, 
would execute almost immediately at $95.28. 
 41. A limit sell order would be a sell order with the caveat that the person placing it would 
not accept less than a certain price.  
 42. A sell limit order in which the NBB at the time the order is sent is above—that is, at 
least as favorable as—the order’s limit is referred to as a marketable sell limit order. 
 43. Quotes in fact can move quite quickly. In the ten minutes following when Maria first 
contacted her broker and noted the best offer of $95.29, the offer was at one point as low as 
$95.28 and as high as $95.33. If, by the time the order arrives, the NBO had moved above 
$95.31, Maria’s limit order would not execute even though it was considered “marketable” when 
sent. Note, however, that the order, until its expiration or cancellation, remains a commitment 
to buy 200 shares at $95.31 or less.  
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nonmarketable sell limit order is a sell limit order with a price limit 
above the NBB at the time it is sent, because at that moment, no one 
in the market is willing to buy at a price this high. 
4. Where bid and offer quotes come from.  The foregoing shows 
that equity-market trading venues provide a place for market 
participants to display a variety of different trading interests. In the 
market we have described, the best offer quote is $95.29 with a depth 
of 1,000 shares. This is the result of persons who had previously 
posted still-in-effect nonmarketable sell orders with a limit of $95.29 
that aggregate to 1,000 shares (that is, sell orders with a limit price 
above the NBB, which in our example is $98.28).44 
5. Making and taking liquidity.  The persons who have posted 
these standing nonmarketable limit sell orders have provided Maria 
with the option to trade immediately at $95.29, an option she can 
exercise by sending in a marketable order. We say that these persons 
have provided liquidity or that they are makers of liquidity. Maria, 
who in our examples takes advantage of this ability to trade 
immediately by submitting either a market order or a marketable 
limit order, consumes liquidity. She is a taker of liquidity. 
6. The trade-off between taking and making liquidity.  If Maria is 
willing to be less aggressive, she can instead attempt to acquire her 
Apple shares by putting in a nonmarketable limit order to buy 200 
shares at $95.28. Then, if the quotes do not change by the time her 
order reaches the market, she will be adding 200 more shares to the 
already existing NBB for 500 shares at $95.28. Thus, if she follows this 
less-aggressive strategy, she can be a maker, not a taker, of liquidity, 
even though, unlike an HFT, she is not in the business of liquidity 
supply. 
If Maria follows this less-aggressive strategy and a sufficient 
number of marketable sell orders come in before her offer expires or 
is cancelled, Maria’s limit order will execute and she will have paid a 
penny less per share. If a sufficient number of such sell orders do not 
come in, her order will fail to execute. She then runs the risk that she 
may still want to purchase the shares and that the offer quotes will 
 
 44. Similarly, the best bid quote is $95.28 with a depth of 500 shares. This is the result of 
persons who had previously posted still-in-effect nonmarketable buy orders with a limit of 
$95.28 that aggregate to 500 shares (that is, buy orders with a limit price below the NBO, which 
in our example is $98.29). 
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have moved up, in which case she will have to pay more than the 
$95.29 per share she would have paid had she initially submitted a 
marketable order. Market orders provide speed and certainty of 
execution. Limit orders may obtain a better price but are less certain 
to execute. 
B. The Mechanics of Trading on a Single Venue 
In order to understand the dynamics of a multivenue electronic-
limit-order-book market and the standard approach to its depiction, it 
is convenient to begin the discussion by considering how trades would 
be depicted if we instead had just a single trading venue.45 In the 
Section following, we will add the complications involved with the 
multivenue system we have today. 
1. Depicting the initial book.  As an example, consider the initial 
state of an order book for a stock such as XYZ. This book (that is, the 
collection of standing limit orders) can be depicted as follows: 
 
BIDS OFFERS 
PRICE SHARES PRICE SHARES 
30.48 500 30.50 700
30.46 200 30.51 300 
30.45 300 30.52 400 
30.44 200 30.57 400
 
In this case, the best offer is $30.50 with 700 shares available, and 
the best bid is $30.48 with 500 shares available.46 This simple 
 
 45. This is the way a CLOB market would work. As already noted, though the matter is 
controversial, some commentators believe it would have been better if Congress had required 
that there be a single venue rather than pushing for the competitive, multivenue system that has 
in fact developed. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 46. Note that the lowest offer of $30.50 is above the highest bid of $30.48. If that were not 
the case, then the seller and buyer should transact given that the seller would be willing to 
accept less than the buyer is willing to pay. Thus, under normal circumstances, the lowest offer 
resting on a venue should exceed the highest bid. 
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description of the “top of the book” is all the information the typical 
retail investor receives. Notice, however, that this description does 
not fully describe the market. For example, this simple top-of-the-
book description does not reveal that investors have bid 500 
additional and offered 700 additional shares within three cents of the 
best market quotes. In other words, information about the depth of 
the book beyond the best bid and offer is revealed only by a full order 
book. Notice also that even with the fuller depiction set out above, 
one cannot tell whether the book consists of seven offers of 100 
shares each at $30.50 or one offer of 700 shares. 
2. Depicting a marketable limit buy order.  Suppose that Anna 
decides she wishes to buy 400 shares of XYZ, but is not willing to pay 
more than $30.60 per share. Accordingly, she instructs her broker to 
submit a limit order to buy 400 shares with a limit price of $30.60. 
Because $30.60 is above the best offer of $30.50 and more than 400 
shares are available at $30.50, her order is marketable and would 
transact immediately at a price of $30.50. 
Regulation NMS requires that a report of the executed 
transaction—a sale of 400 shares at $30.50—be sent almost 
immediately to a publicly disseminated last-trade data stream that 
forms the national reporting system for transactions.47 The venue is 
also allowed to simultaneously send the same last-trade report to 
persons, including co-locating HFTs, that contract with it to receive a 
direct feed.48 Regulation NMS also requires that a report of the 
changes in the quotes—the reduction in the number of shares offered 
at $30.50 from 700 to 300—be sent to a publicly disseminated quote 
stream that forms the national reporting system for quotes49 (and 
again, the venue may simultaneously send this information to 
contracting persons such as co-locating HFTs with a direct feed).50 
The new order book, reflecting this change, would appear as follows: 
  
 
 47. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.601(b)(2) (2015). 
 48. Id. See infra Part VI.A.3 (providing a fuller description and discussion of proposed 
reforms to this practice). 
 49. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2015). 
 50. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3601 (Jan. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
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BIDS OFFERS 
PRICE SHARES PRICE SHARES 
30.48 500 30.50 300 
30.46 200 30.51 300 
30.45 300 30.52 100
30.44 200 30.57 400 
 
3. Depicting a nonmarketable limit buy order.  Suppose that another 
investor, Dave, prompted by this new state of the book, decides he 
wishes to buy 200 shares of XYZ, but is not willing to pay more than 
$30.49 per share. Accordingly, he instructs his broker to submit a limit 
order to buy 200 shares with a limit price of $30.49. Because $30.49 is 
below the best offer of $30.50, his order is nonmarketable and no 
transaction will occur. Instead, his limit order will be posted on the 
limit order book. Because he is expressing his willingness to buy at 
$30.49, it becomes a bid for 200 shares at this price. Because $30.49 is 
higher than the previous best bid, Dave’s limit order becomes the new 
best bid, thereby reducing the spread between the best bid and the 
best offer by a penny (though also reducing depth at the best bid to 
200 shares). The new book reflecting the posting of this new order 
would appear as follows: 
 
BIDS OFFERS 
PRICE SHARES PRICE SHARES 
30.49 200 30.50 300 
30.48 500 30.51 300
30.46 200 30.52 100 
30.45 300 30.57 400 
30.44 200  
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Information about the new state of the book would be 
disseminated as in the last example. 
4. Symmetry for sell orders.  We have presented the dynamics 
associated with buy orders: both marketable buy orders, which reduce 
what is available on the offer side of the book, and nonmarketable 
buy orders, which add to the bid side of the book. The situation is 
symmetric for sell orders—both marketable sell orders, which reduce 
what is available on the bid side of the book, and nonmarketable sell 
orders, which add to the offer side of the book. 
C. The Mechanics of Trading on Multiple Exchanges 
With multiple exchanges, the order book dynamics are similar, 
but the routing of the order can be much more complicated. Part of 
the complication comes from Regulation NMS Rule 611, which 
requires that a marketable sell order—regardless of the trading venue 
to which it is originally sent—execute at a price equal to the best bid 
available on any exchange in the country, and a marketable buy order 
at the best offer.51 To see how this works, consider the following 
consolidated-limit-order book, which aggregates the quotes from all 
the exchanges in the country. The aggregate number of shares bid or 
offered at any given exchange is identified by a single letter 
corresponding to that exchange. 
  
 
 51. Federal regulation requires trading venues to establish procedures reasonably designed 
to prevent the purchase or sale of a stock at a price inferior to the lowest offer or highest bid, 
respectively, which is disseminated on the national reporting system for quotations. See 17 
C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2015) (establishing the rule); id. § 242.600(b) (defining relevant terms). 
Regulation NMS is the most important body of federal regulation governing trading in the stock 
market. 
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BIDS OFFERS
PRICE SHARES PRICE SHARES 
30.48 Q 300 
P 200 
30.50 Q 500 
P 100 
Z 100 
30.46 Q 200 30.51 Q 500 
D 100
30.45 Z 300 30.52 Q 400 
30.44 Z 200 30.57 Q 400 
 
Now consider Maria wanting to purchase 1,000 shares. One way 
to accomplish this is for her broker to send the following market buy 
orders: 800 shares to Q, 100 shares to P, 100 shares to Z. Assuming 
the quotes are still good by the time her order arrives at these 
respective venues, she would pay an average price of $30.503. If speed 
were important and there was reason to think that the order would 
reach Q first, it might appear to be better to send the whole 1,000-
share order to Q and pay the slightly higher average price of $30.505. 
Because of Rule 611,52 however, sending the whole order to Q would 
not have this result. Instead, Q is required to have a system that 
would forward 100-share orders to each of P and Z, at which shares 
were also available at the NBO of $30.50. These orders would execute 
on these venues at this price. On Q, 500 shares would execute at 
$30.50 and the remaining 300 at $30.51. Again, the average price 
would be $30.503. 
The preceding discussion, however, assumes that everyone 
involved is instantly aware of all newly executed transactions and all 
changes in quotes. It also assumes that orders can be sent and 
cancelled instantaneously. Things become more interesting when we 
drop these unrealistic assumptions. Consider first how Maria’s broker 
became aware of the quotations and how Q knows about offers on P 
and Z at $30.50. Traditionally, each exchange independently provided 
 
 52. Id. § 242.611(a)(1). 
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quotation and transaction information. As discussed, however, the 
1975 NMS amendments to the Exchange Act included broad 
provisions for consolidating information in the U.S. stock market, 
which reflected the congressional vision of an electronically linked 
market made up of competing venues trading in the stock of the same 
issuers.53 Full realization of this vision, including rules leading to the 
construction of the national reporting system for quotes and 
transactions, took thirty years, culminating in the SEC’s adoption of 
Regulation NMS.54 
According to the rules, a trading venue must participate in 
reporting plans with the SEC, which must approve these plans.55 The 
plan must provide that there is a system by which the best bid and 
best offer quotes posted on the venue for each issuer’s stock traded 
there is furnished to an exclusive processor. The price and size of all 
transactions in each of these stocks executed on the venue must also 
be furnished. The exclusive processor consolidates all of this 
information with the information the processor acquires concerning 
each of the same stocks from the other venues where they trade. 
From all this, the exclusive processor constructs a consolidated book 
depicting the best offer and best bid for a stock, at each of the venues 
at which it trades and the corresponding sizes. The exclusive 
processor must make this quote information, as well as price and size 
information concerning the latest executed transactions in the stock, 
available to the public on terms that are fair and reasonable.56 At any 
point in time, the best bid and best offer on this consolidated book 
represents the official NBB and NBO. 
It takes a short period of time for the national reporting system 
to reflect any change in the quotations on a venue or any transaction 
executed on that venue. Thus, the national reporting system lags 
slightly behind any change in what is the best bid or offer available at 
any venue. As we noted in our initial descriptions of electronic front 
running, slow-market arbitrage, and dark-pool-midpoint-order 
exploitation, HFTs can—through co-location, private-data feeds, and 
 
 53. Section 11A(c)(1)(B) provides, inter alia, that the SEC should “assure the prompt, 
accurate, reliable, and fair . . . distribution” of transaction information. Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), 89 Stat. 97, 115 (1975). 
 54. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 25, 
2005). 
 55. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600(b)(21), 242.601, 242.603, 242.608 (2015) (establishing plan 
requirement and rules). 
 56. See id. §§ 242.601, 242.602, 242.608. 
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superior information-technology infrastructure—become aware of 
changes in offers or bids, or of newly executed transactions, before 
the information becomes available to the public from the exclusive 
processor.57 During this brief reporting lag, they can act on this 
information by cancelling standing limit orders and posting new ones. 
Thus, by the time Maria sees the quotes depicted in the sample 
consolidated book above, they may no longer in fact be available. The 
same is true for venue Q at the time her order arrives there. 
III.  THE ECONOMICS OF LIQUIDITY PROVISION 
A professional supplier of liquidity for an issuer’s shares—today, 
typically an HFT posting buy and sell limit orders—engages in both 
the frequent purchase and frequent sale of these shares. In doing so, it 
stands ready to buy and sell shares up to stated amounts at stated 
prices. The liquidity supplier makes money if on average it sells the 
shares it buys for more than the price paid. It might appear that doing 
so is easy, even in markets with a one cent spread: buy at the bid and 
sell at the offer and make a half cent per share on every transaction. 
Do this for a billion shares and pretty soon you are talking about real 
money. In fact, however, it is not so easy. 
The persons with whom a liquidity supplier trades generally do 
not reveal their identities. The possibility always exists that the 
person (the “trader”) who places a marketable order that executes 
against the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so because the trader 
has private information not known to most of the market or to the 
liquidity supplier.58 An informed trader of this kind will buy from the 
liquidity supplier when her private information suggests that the 
stock’s value is above the liquidity provider’s offer. And she will sell 
to the liquidity supplier when her private information suggests the 
value is below the liquidity provider’s bid. In such transactions, the 
liquidity supplier sells at prices below the value of the stock and buys 
at prices above the value of the stock, not a formula for success. 
Despite this, the liquidity supplier, if skillful, can still make money on 
a net basis, because the remaining traders with whom it transacts do 
not possess private information and the liquidity supplier can profit 
on these transactions. 
 
 57. See supra Part I.C. 
 58. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 158 (discussing analyses indicating that in most markets 
adverse selection accounts for the majority of the bid-ask spread). 
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A. Kinds of Private Information and Their Sources 
There are three primary kinds of private information, which we 
will label inside information, announcement information, and 
fundamental value information. 
1. Inside information.  Inside information has its ultimate origins 
from within some institutional source. Frequently, this institutional 
source is the issuing company of the stock itself. This is information 
the institution seeks to prevent from becoming public or from being 
the basis of trading by others. Trading on such information is, under 
many circumstances, illegal under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5.59 The existence of cases of successful prosecutions 
under these provisions shows that such information is the basis of at 
least some of the informed trading that occurs in the market.60 
2. Announcement information.  Announcement information is 
information that has only just been publicly revealed, for example a 
government statistic about the economy or a company’s earnings 
announcement. A trader who acts on this information extremely 
quickly, before other traders and the liquidity suppliers themselves 
can react, is also an informed trader. 
3. Fundamental value information.  Fundamental value 
information is a superior estimate of an issuer’s future cash flows 
based on a person gathering bits of publicly available information and 
analyzing that information in a sophisticated way. The traders whose 
trades are informed due to this kind of information include hedge 
funds, actively managed mutual and pension funds, nonprofit 
institutions, and very wealthy individuals with actively managed 
portfolios. Liquidity suppliers are vulnerable to trades based on these 
superior estimates because liquidity suppliers tend to specialize in the 
business of supplying liquidity. Thus, they generally do not engage in 
their own fundamental analysis. 
B. Adverse Selection 
Whatever the source of an informed trader’s private information, 
the liquidity provider will be subject to adverse selection and lose 
 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–66 (1997) (reinstating an insider-
trading conviction). 
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 1:17 PM 
218 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:191 
money when it buys at the bid from informed sellers or sells at the 
offer to informed buyers. As long as there are enough uninformed 
traders willing to suffer the inevitable expected trading losses of 
always buying at the offer and selling at the bid, however, the 
liquidity provider can break even.61 The spread simply needs to be 
large enough between the bid and offer that the losses accrued by 
transacting with informed traders are offset by the profits accrued 
from transacting with uninformed investors.62 
Two useful ways exist of thinking about the calculations that 
liquidity providers need to perform to survive in a competitive 
market. The first, sometimes referred to as the “accounting 
perspective,”63 is based on the proposition that for a liquidity supplier 
to survive in business, what it loses from transacting with the 
informed traders must be offset by what it gains from transacting with 
uninformed traders. The second, sometimes referred to as the 
“information perspective,”64 relates to how a liquidity supplier 
rationally should update its estimate of a stock’s value depending on 
whether the next order to transact against its quotes is a buy or a sell. 
Each of these two perspectives leads to the same bid-ask spread.65  
1. The accounting perspective.  At a point in time, let P be the 
market’s assessment of the value of a share of stock given current 
information. If A and B are respectively the offer and bid, and the 
market consists entirely of traders with no private information, then 
the liquidity provider’s expected profits are (A – P) from buyers and 
(P – B) from sellers. A liquidity provider receives A from an 
uninformed buyer and gives up a share of stock worth, given current 
information, P. Similarly, the liquidity provider pays out B to an 
uninformed seller and receives a share of stock worth P. 
Now suppose, however, that some traders in the market may be 
informed. An informed trader’s private information leads to a 
 
 61. The term “break even” is used here to include an ordinary market return on capital 
that would be considered “profit” from an accounting perspective. 
 62. It is possible for the market to break down so there is no trade. The smaller the portion 
of trading attributable to uninformed traders, the bigger the spread needs to be to compensate 
for the losses from the informed traders. But the bigger the spread, the fewer the uninformed 
investors willing to tolerate the associated trading losses.  
 63. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 320–21 (discussing the accounting and information 
perspectives).  
 64. Id.  
 65. See generally Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 15. 
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different, on average more accurate, appraisal of the stock’s value 
than the market assessment of P. Informed traders will buy if their 
appraisal of the stock value, V, exceeds A, the offer. They will sell if 
their estimate of value, V, is below B, the bid. The liquidity supplier 
knows that if a buyer is informed, its view of V will, on average, be 
more accurate than the view of others in the market. Therefore the 
liquidity supplier rationally expects that if it unknowingly sells at A to 
a person who is informed, on average V is greater than A. It will 
similarly expect that if it unknowingly buys at B from a person who is 
informed, on average V is less than B. Hence, expected profits from 
transactions with informed buyers are negative, as are profits from 
transactions with informed sellers. 
The final input to the calculation is the likelihood of informed 
and uninformed traders. On average, buy and sell orders from 
uninformed traders will be equal in number. If trading takes place on 
the basis of positive private information, the informed traders will 
submit buy orders but not sell orders. 
A concrete example is useful here. Suppose that over the next 
short interval of time the market knows there will be an 
announcement. If it contains good news, the apparent value of the 
stock will rise from $60.00 to $61.00. If it contains bad news, the 
apparent value will instead fall to $59.00. To those without private 
information, it is equally likely that the news will be good as that it 
will be bad. Informed traders, however, know what the 
announcement will be. One percent of the order flow is expected to 
come from informed traders, who will buy if what they know is good 
and sell if what they know is bad. The uninformed are equally likely 
to buy or sell. 
Then, the probability that a buy is from an informed trader is (.5 
x .01) (the likelihood the information is positive multiplied by the 
percentage of trades that will be informed), whereas the probability 
that it is from an uninformed trader is (.99 x .5) (the percentage of 
traders that are uninformed multiplied by the even chance they will 
be buyers rather than sellers). Thus, for the offer quote not to be a 
losing proposition, it must be at least as big as the A that solves: 
 
(.5 x .01)(A – $61.00) + (.99 x .5)(A – $60) = 0 
 
Solving this equation, A, the offer, must be $60.01. By the same 
reasoning, for the bid quote not to be a losing proposition, it should 
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be $59.99, that is, a spread of two cents in a competitive market of 
liquidity suppliers.66 
2. The information perspective.  The second way to view the 
quoting problem is the following. A liquidity supplier knows it is 
possible that the next marketable order that arrives will be from an 
informed trader. The liquidity supplier knows that if the next 
marketable order to arrive is a buy, it is possibly motivated by 
positive private information and there is no chance it is motivated by 
negative private information. Similarly, if the next order to arrive is a 
sell, it is possibly motivated by negative private information and there 
is no chance it is motivated by positive private information. Thus, 
whichever is the kind of order next to arrive, its arrival will alter the 
liquidity supplier’s estimate of the stock’s value: up if it is a buy order 
and down if it is a sell order. The offer and the bid are set in advance 
of knowing which it will be, with the offer being contingent on the 
arriving order being a buy and the bid on it being a sell. Thus, when a 
liquidity supplier is deciding on its offer price, it knows an informed 
trader will only accept that offer if the information was positive, and 
that acceptance would cause the liquidity supplier to revise its 
estimate upward. So, for a transaction with a buy order to be regret 
free, the liquidity supplier must set the offer to reflect this upward 
revision in advance. The same logic applies for setting the bid: to be 
regret free it must reflect the downward revision that would 
accompany the arrival of a sell order.67 
3. The pattern of transaction prices in the presence of informed 
trading.  This second approach highlights an important 
characterization of rational liquidity provision in a market with 
private information. Liquidity suppliers will be constantly updating 
valuations in response to transactions. With a sufficient number of 
trades, the market price will come to reflect private information. The 
behavior of rational liquidity providers thus reflects a kind of 
 
 66. For expositional simplicity, we are ignoring here other determinants of the bid-ask 
spread, including inventory costs and the marginal costs for the personnel and facilities 
necessary to be in the liquidity supply business. See generally Ananth Madhavan, Market 
Microstructure: A Survey, 2 J. FIN. MKTS. 205, 212–23 (2008) (discussing empirical studies of 
various determinants and microstructure models generally). None of the other determinants 
undermine the conclusions in this Article that flow from this analysis. 
 67. Using the example in the text and applying Bayes’ Rule leads to exactly the same 
calculation of the bid and ask as was generated by the accounting perspective. See Glosten & 
Milgrom, supra note 15, at 93–94. 
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“invisible hand”: simply as a result of their efforts to avoid losses to 
informed traders, liquidity providers are repeatedly revising their 
quotes so they come to fully reflect informed traders’ information, 
making stock prices genuinely informative. In our example, suppose 
the news known by the informed traders is good. Over a period of 
time, both marketable buy and marketable sell orders will arrive at 
trading venues, but there will be more buys than sells. As a result, 
although there will be ups and downs in the offers and bids as the 
estimate of value moves up and down with the arrival of each buy and 
sell order, the ups will predominate and the midpoint between the bid 
and offer will trend upward toward $61. Similarly, if the news known 
by the informed traders is bad, the midpoint will trend downward 
toward $59. Empirical evidence strongly supports the results of these 
adverse-selection models: analyses of intraday changes in quotes and 
in the prices of executed transactions consistently show that they 
respond to the pattern of buy and sell orders at the time.68 
IV.  THE EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
Now that the reader has a basic understanding of how the new 
stock market works, we can introduce the criteria with which we will 
evaluate today’s most controversial market practices and which can 
be used more generally to analyze stock market public policy issues. 
The parties engaged in each of these controversial practices do so in a 
competitive market on a repeated basis and the other actors in the 
system generally take this fact into account in determining their own 
actions. The question then is how the existence of the practice affects 
the system as a whole in terms of its ultimate impact on the multiple 
social goals that equity-trading markets are expected to serve and that 
form the justificatory basis for regulation when the markets fall short. 
 
 68. See generally Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung & Herb Johnson, The Intraday Behavior of 
Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
329, 334 (1995) (suggesting that adverse selection is an important determinant of the intraday 
behavior of bid-ask spreads); Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the 
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988) (testing a model in which the 
bid-ask spread is divided into an adverse-selection component and a transitory component due 
to inventory costs, clearing costs, and other factors). 
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A. Goals 
A number of social goals animate discussion of secondary equity 
markets69 and their regulation: (i) promoting the efficient allocation of 
capital so it goes to the most promising new investment projects in 
our economy; (ii) promoting the efficient operation of the economy’s 
existing productive capacity; (iii) promoting the efficient allocation of 
resources between current and future periods so as to best satisfy the 
needs of firms seeking funds for real investments (trading the promise 
of future dollars to obtain current dollars) and the needs of savers 
seeking to forgo current consumption in order to enjoy future 
consumption (trading current dollars to obtain the promise of future 
dollars); (iv) promoting the efficient allocation among investors of the 
risks associated with holding securities so that the volatility in the 
cash flows generated by productive enterprises is borne by risk-averse 
investors in a way that generates the least disutility; (v) fostering an 
overall sense of fairness; (vi) economizing on the real resources 
society devotes to the operation of the trading markets and to the 
enforcement and compliance costs associated with their regulation; 
and (vii) fostering innovation that over time can improve the capacity 
of the system to serve these preceding goals. 
Any particular practice in the market may, of course, have a 
positive impact in terms of some of these seven goals and a negative 
impact in terms of others. It is nevertheless desirable to structure the 
market for the secondary trading of equities so no unnecessary trade-
offs occur—that is, so it satisfies each goal to the fullest extent 
possible without compromising one or more others—and to identify 
the nature of the remaining unavoidable trade-offs so intelligent 
choices can be made. 
B. Market Characteristics that Impact on These Goals 
The stock market’s operations relate to these social goals in 
complex ways that result from its interacting characteristics. The two 
most important characteristics are share-price accuracy and liquidity. 
The impact of any given practice on the goals above is most easily 
evaluated through a two-step process, first assessing the effect of the 
practice on each of these two market characteristics and then 
 
 69. In the primary market, stocks are purchased from the company issuing those stocks, 
whereas in the secondary market, traders buy and sell stocks from each other. Stock exchanges 
are fundamentally secondary markets. 
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identifying the effect of the characteristic on the goals. For each of the 
controversial practices, we also identify the wealth transfers it 
predictably generates. We do this for two reasons. First, much of the 
criticism of the modern stock market as “unfair” seems to pivot on its 
perceived wealth-transfer effects. Second, because understanding how 
a practice affects the wealth of various market participants is essential 
to understanding how it affects their behavior, and consequently, 
liquidity and price accuracy. 
1. Share-price accuracy.  Price accuracy relates to the accuracy 
with which the market price of an issuer’s shares predicts the issuer’s 
future cash flows.70 Because the price of any new share offering by a 
publicly traded issuer will be determined largely by the price of its 
already outstanding shares in the stock market, more accurate stock 
market prices will lead to capital being more likely to go to the issuers 
with the most promising new real investment projects. Share price 
also influences the availability of new project funding from other 
outside sources and the willingness of managers to use internal funds 
for investment, and so greater price accuracy assists the efficient 
allocation of capital in these other ways as well.71 
More generally, accurate share prices help reveal managers who 
are performing poorly both in terms of their deployment of internal 
funds for new investment projects (again assisting the efficient 
allocation of capital), and in terms of their management of the issuer’s 
current assets (assisting the efficient operation of the economy’s 
existing productive capacity).72 
Over time, more accurate share prices today also likely lead to a 
greater sense of fairness on the part of investors because they will 
experience fewer negative surprises.73 
 
 70. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 206–14 (discussing the social benefits of accurate stock 
prices). 
 71. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
260–64 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 258–60. 
 73. In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inaccurate, 
is an unbiased predictor of an issuer’s future cash flows. If it is inaccurate, it is just more likely to 
be far off, one way or the other, from how things ultimately turn out. Thus, efficient, but 
relatively inaccurate, prices would result in as many positive surprises as negative ones. To many 
investors, however, the negative surprise is likely to be more salient. So, when a negative 
surprise materializes, it generates a sense of grievance even though, ex ante, a positive surprise 
was equally likely.  
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2. Liquidity.  A second characteristic is how liquid the market is. 
Liquidity is a multidimensional concept that relates to the size of a 
trade, the price at which it is accomplished, and the time it takes to 
accomplish the trade.74 Generally, the larger the size of the purchase 
or sale and the faster one wishes to accomplish it, the less desirable 
will be the price. The more liquid the market is, however, the less 
severe are these trade-offs.75 For a small retail purchase or sale of 
stock, the spread between the NBO and the NBB is a good measure 
of liquidity because the trader can effect the buy or sell transaction 
immediately at those respective prices and, in essence, will be paying 
half the spread to do so. For larger orders, how much is available at 
prices not too inferior to the NBO or NBB (the “depth of the book”) 
will become relevant as well. 
Liquidity also has an impact on a number of social goals: 
a. More efficient allocation of resources over time.  To start, the 
prospect of greater liquidity promotes more efficient allocation of 
resources over time. Consider this first in terms of enterprises seeking 
new capital to devote to real investment projects. In essence, they are 
purchasers of current dollars in return for the promise of future 
dollars. The more liquid an issuer’s shares are, the more valuable 
their shares are to hold for any given level of expected future cash 
flow.76 Thus, when an issuer offers shares in the primary market, the 
more liquid investors anticipate the shares will be in the future, the 
higher the price, all else equal, at which the issuer can sell its shares. 
Hence, the lower the issuer’s cost of capital.77 
In welfare economics terms, just like a tax, illiquidity results in a 
wedge between the value of what the savers (the purchasers of future 
 
 74. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 394–410 (analyzing liquidity). 
 75. Id. 
 76. For a purchaser of the shares in the primary market—the sellers of current dollars in 
return for the promise of receiving future dollars—more liquidity means it is less costly to sell 
her shares in the future to provide for future consumption because the bid will be less below the 
midpoint between the bid and the offer. In addition, more liquidity means that buyers in the 
market at the time of this sale would value the shares more highly so that this midpoint will be 
higher. This is because it is less expensive to buy the shares in the sense that the offer will be less 
above the midpoint and again it will be less expensive for these buyers to sell at yet some further 
point in the future because the bid then will be less below the midpoint.  
 77. The cost of capital is lower because the prospect of a smaller bid-ask spread results in 
the same issuer’s expected future cash flow being discounted to present value at a lower 
discount rate. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 
J. FIN. ECON. 223, 230 (1986); Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: 
Financial Management Implications, 17 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1988). 
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dollars) expect to receive in the future and what the entrepreneurs or 
issuers (the suppliers of future dollars in the form of future dividend 
streams) expect to give up in the future.78 As a result, illiquidity 
results in the less efficient allocation of resources over time. This 
wedge prevents certain transactions from occurring that would have 
occurred if the shares were expected to be more liquid. The fact that, 
absent this wedge, the issuer and savers would have willingly entered 
into these transactions means the transactions prevented by illiquidity 
are ones that would have made both parties better off on an expected 
basis. These lost transactions are projects with expected returns that 
are lower than the marginal project that gets funded in a world with a 
degree of illiquidity, but that nevertheless are high enough to make 
some people feel that, absent liquidity concerns, sacrificing their 
current dollars for the projects’ promises of future ones would be 
worthwhile.79 
b. Greater share-price accuracy.  More liquidity also lowers the 
transaction costs associated with speculative trading based on 
acquiring a variety of bits of publicly available information and 
analyzing them to make more accurate predictions of an issuer’s cash 
flows, that is, creating fundamental value information.80 Thus, it 
stimulates such activity and in the process increases share-price 
accuracy, with the attendant benefits in terms of more efficient capital 
allocation and utilization of existing productive capacity discussed just 
above. 
c. More efficient allocation of risk.  Greater liquidity also 
promotes the more efficient allocation of risk.81 Constant change in 
the world means that what constitutes an individual’s optimal 
portfolio, in terms of diversification and of the individual’s relative 
degree of risk aversion, is always shifting. By making both the 
purchase and sale of securities less expensive, greater liquidity allows 
the individual investor to cost-effectively adjust her portfolio over 
time to keep it closer at each moment to what is optimal for her. 
 
 78. See THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO & AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY: 
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 307 (2013) (discussing how illiquidity acts as a wedge 
between transaction prices and the fundamental value of assets). 
 79. HARRIS, supra note 18, at 214–15. 
 80. See id. at 206–14 (discussing social value of liquidity). 
 81. Id. 
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V.  ANALYZING THE EIGHT MOST CONTROVERSIAL NEW STOCK 
MARKET PRACTICES 
The usefulness of our analytical framework for assessing the new 
stock market can be demonstrated by its application to the new stock 
market’s eight most controversial practices. 
A. Electronic Front Running 
So-called “electronic front running” involves a situation in which 
an HFT, before others in the market, learns of a transaction that has 
occurred at one exchange and alters its quotes on other exchanges 
given the possibility that similar orders may still be in transit heading 
toward other exchanges. The HFT races ahead of these orders still on 
their way to the other exchanges and, before they arrive at their 
destinations, changes its quotes on these other exchanges.82 
Electronic front running has been harshly criticized. For 
example, Charlie Munger, vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, has 
objected that high-frequency trading is “legalized front-running[,] . . . 
and it should never have been able to reach the size that it did.”83 
Similarly, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has 
complained that “[w]hen blinding speed is coupled with early access 
to data, it gives small groups of traders the power to manipulate 
market movements in their own favor before anyone else knows 
what’s happening.”84 Flash Boys, published after these comments, 
makes electronic front running its principal focus.85 Even more 
 
 82. See supra Part I.C.1. For fascinating empirical evidence suggesting that electronic front 
running occurs, see Vincent van Kervel, Liquidity: What You See Is What You Get? 2–6 (May 
2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Tilburg University), http://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/home/
Department_of_Finance__VG5_/LQ5/VanKervel.pdf [http://perma.cc/RBX2-P9QP] (modeling 
and gathering empirical evidence that transactions on venues are followed by limit order 
cancellations on competing venues). 
 83. Sam Mamudi, Charlie Munger: HFT is Legalized Front-Running, BARRON’S: STOCKS 
TO WATCH (May 3, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/05/03/
charlie-munger-hft-is-legalized-front-running [http://perma.cc/NS8R-V7QN].  
 84. Linette Lopez, New York’s Attorney General Has Declared War on Cheating High-
Frequency Traders, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
schneiderman-targets-hft-front-running-2013-9 [http://perma.cc/EX85-TCH3].  
 85. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 108, 126, 172. Since the publication of the book in the 
spring of 2014, a host of other commentators have chimed in with criticism equating electronic 
front running with traditional illegal front running. See, e.g., Ellen Brown, Computerized Front 
Running: Another Goldman-Dominated Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (June 26, 2010, 
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-brown/computerized-front-runnin_b_548148.
html [http://perma.cc/X379-8R3P] (stating that electronic front running contributes to “the 
manipulation of markets for economic and political ends”); Gene Marcial, High-Frequency 
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015  1:17 PM 
2015] THE NEW STOCK MARKET 227 
recently, a prominent class-action suit was filed against all of the 
nation’s exchanges that, in support of its claim of fraud, includes 
allegations that the exchanges cooperated with HFTs in facilitating 
electronic front running.86 
Substantively, all these criticisms focus on the fact that when an 
HFT engages in an act of electronic front running, the HFT can be 
expected to be better off and some other trader involved worse off. It 
should be noted at the outset, however, that the HFT practice labeled 
as “electronic front running” is distinctly different from the kind of 
behavior that has traditionally been termed “front running.” 
Traditional front running, which is clearly illegal, relates to a situation 
involving a customer giving her broker an order to handle. Then the 
broker, which has a legal duty to its customer not to use knowledge of 
its customer’s order to its own advantage, breaches this duty by 
engaging in a trade on its own behalf that executes ahead of the 
customer’s order.87 In contrast, when an HFT engages in the practice 
labeled as “electronic front running,” it has no preexisting 
relationship with the trader placing the order that the HFT detects 
and so no relationship between the two could give rise to a duty on 
the part of the HFT akin to what a broker owes its customer. The 
matter of whether rules should prevent HFTs from engaging in this 
practice is of course an appropriate issue for policy analysis, as is 
 
Trading Mainly Hurts the Traders and Short-Term Investors, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:06 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2014/04/02/high-frequency-trading-mainly-hurts-the-
traders-and-short-term-investors [http://perma.cc/4DTH-SN7W] (stating that “front-running on 
Wall Street, which is what high-frequency trading is all about and what it really intends to be, is 
old news,” and arguing that only the speed with which HFTs front run other investors is new). 
 86. Amended Complaint at 26, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-
2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). 
 87. Traditional front running is prohibited under the common law, federal law, and 
industry self-regulatory standards. See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 676 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding front running to be illegal under 
principles of agency and federal law). The SEC prosecutes front running as a violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-(5). See, e.g., Complaint at 13, SEC v. Bergin, 
2015 WL 4275509 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-1940), 2013 WL 2400793 (charging 
trader for front running clients under Section 10(b)); see also Concept Release on Equity 
Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3609 (proposed Jan. 14, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (discussing the illegality of front running). FINRA 
Rule 5270(a) prohibits trading in a security if an individual has “material, non-public market 
information concerning [a customer’s] imminent block transaction in that security,” until that 
block transaction has become public. FINRA Rules, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., at Rule 
5270 [hereinafter FINRA Rules], http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?
rbid=2403&element_id=607&record_id=609&filtered_tag= [http://perma.cc/78SE-RWUZ] (last 
amended Sept. 3, 2013). 
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being undertaken here. It is important to note, however, that the 
practice involves no breach of duty or mutually-agreed-upon terms 
between contracting parties, nor does it involve any obvious breach 
by HFTs of the federal anti-fraud laws. 
1. An example.  We will examine the practice of electronic front 
running through use of an example. For simplicity of exposition, just 
one HFT, Lightning, and two exchanges, BATS Y and NASDAQ, are 
involved. Lightning has co-location facilities at the respective 
locations of the BATS Y and NASDAQ matching engines. A high-
speed fiber-optic cable connects these co-location facilities with each 
other.88 
An actively managed institutional investor, Smartmoney, decides 
that Amgen’s future cash flows are going to be greater than its 
current price suggests. The NBO is $148.00, with 10,000 shares being 
offered at this price on BATS Y and 35,000 shares at this price on 
NASDAQ. Smartmoney decides to buy a substantial block of Amgen 
stock and sends a 10,000 share market buy order to BATS Y and a 
35,000 share market buy order to NYSE.89 The 35,000 shares offered 
at $148.00 on NASDAQ are all from sell limit orders posted by 
Lightning. 
The order sent to BATS Y arrives at its destination first and 
executes. Lightning’s co-location facility there learns of the 
transaction very quickly. An algorithm infers from this information 
that an informed trader might be looking to buy a large number of 
Amgen shares and thus may have sent buy orders to other exchanges 
as well. Because of Lightning’s ultra-high-speed connection, it has the 
ability to send a message from its BATS Y co-location facility to its 
co-location facility at NASDAQ, which in turn has the ability to 
cancel Lightning’s 35,000 share $148.00 limit sell order posted on 
NASDAQ. All this can happen so fast that the cancellation would 
occur before the arrival there of Smartmoney’s market buy order. If 
 
 88. See supra Parts I.A and I.C for a discussion of exchange matching engines and HFT co-
location facilities. 
 89. This example fleshes out the story by Michael Lewis of how electronic front running 
could occur with Amgen stock in such a situation. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 33–34. Lewis asserts 
that the HFT could profit at the expense of others by cancelling its quotes on another exchange, 
but he does not discuss exactly why it would be profitable for the HFT to do so. Nor does he 
analyze how the quotes initially available might be different if the practice of electronic front 
running were eliminated. The discussion that follows fills in these holes.  
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Lightning does cancel in this fashion, it has engaged in electronic 
front running. 
Why might Lightning wish to cancel its sell limit order on 
NASDAQ? One possibility is that given its inference that a large 
market buy order is likely soon to arrive at NASDAQ, Lightning 
wishes to submit, in place of its cancelled order, a new sell limit order 
for the same number of shares at a higher price, say at $148.02. If 
Lightning does so and Smartmoney’s buy order executes against this 
new higher quote, the HFT will be better off, and Smartmoney worse 
off, by $.02 per share. 
Note though, that the HFT will be able to improve its position in 
this way only if the NASDAQ limit order book has room so that the 
$148.02 offer price is still more attractive to potential buyers than any 
other offers with respect to Amgen already posted on NASDAQ. 
Suppose, for example, that prior to Lightning’s cancellation, the next 
best offer on NASDAQ was 15,000 shares at $148.01 and the best 
offer after that was 20,000 shares at $148.02. The price- and time-
priority rules would mean that Smartmoney’s buy order would 
execute against these other two standing offers, not against any new 
$148.02 offer by Lightning. 
This cautionary note, though, hides a more critical point: 
Lightning may wish to cancel its $148.00 sell limit order even if in fact 
the book contains no room to improve its position by selling to 
Smartmoney at a higher price. Recall that to survive in a competitive 
market, a market maker like Lightning must set its quotes 
aggressively enough to attract business, but not so aggressively that 
the money it makes by buying from, and selling to, uninformed 
traders is less than what it loses by engaging in such transactions with 
informed traders. At the time it posted its sell limit order, Lightning 
calculated $148.00 as the optimal price for an offer of 35,000 shares, 
based on what it knew then about the likelihood of the existence of 
positive private information. Now, however, Lightning knows 
something more: a large buy order has transacted on BATS Y. This 
will cause Lightning to revise upward its assessment of the likelihood 
that private information suggests that the value of a security is higher 
than the market previously thought. The upward revision is very 
possibly great enough that $148.00 is no longer the optimal price at 
which to offer to sell shares. In that case, Lightning will be better off 
cancelling its $148.00 limit offer on NASDAQ. 
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2. Wealth-transfer considerations.  To see the distributive effects 
of electronic front running, we need to consider how the world would 
differ if the practice were eliminated. As a first cut for this discussion 
of the practice’s wealth effects, and for the discussion below of its 
efficiency effects, we will make the assumption, later relaxed, that 
only three kinds of market participants exist: HFTs, informed traders 
who trade on the basis of fundamental value information, and 
uninformed traders.90 
a. Electronic front running narrows spreads.  As the analysis of 
the example makes clear, the practice of electronic front running by 
HFTs makes orders by large purchasers and sellers somewhat less 
anonymous in the sense that the practice allows HFTs to better detect 
the possibility that informed market orders are headed for their limit 
orders. If HFTs did not have the ability to learn these things and alter 
their standing limit orders accordingly, they would know that a larger 
percentage of the trades that will execute against their limit orders 
will come from informed traders. The primary cost of being a liquidity 
supplier—the losses incurred from dealing with informed traders—
would therefore go up. Accordingly, HFTs would increase their 
initially posted spreads to compensate. 
Going back to our example, if Lightning were not able to 
electronically front run, it might have initially posted its limit sell 
order for 35,000 shares at $148.01 instead of $148.00. For the same 
reasons, it would also have a lower bid. So if, with electronic front 
running being allowed, its bid would have been $147.96, without the 
practice its bid might instead have been $147.95. 
b. Electronic front running helps uninformed investors and hurts 
informed investors.  If electronic front running were eliminated, 
uninformed traders and informed traders will each suffer from the 
resulting larger spreads—the higher offers and lower bids—because 
for both it will be more expensive to trade. For uninformed traders, 
that is the end of the story. Informed traders, however, would get a 
more-than-compensating benefit. 
To see why, the starting point again is the fact that the 
elimination of electronic front running would make it more difficult 
 
 90. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the different types of private information. We 
will revisit this discussion later with a more nuanced analysis that focuses on the fortunes of 
each of the three kinds of informed traders: fundamental value information traders, 
announcement traders, and inside-information traders. See infra Part V.A.4. 
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for HFTs to detect indications of possible informed orders, and so 
more informed trades would execute against their quotes. Trading is a 
zero-sum game. Thus, if HFTs did not increase their spreads in 
response to the end of the practice, the gains enjoyed by informed 
investors would just equal the increased losses suffered by HFTs. In 
fact, however, if electronic front running is eliminated, then HFTs will 
increase their spreads. They will do so by an amount just sufficient to 
cover what these losses would otherwise be.91 This is because, as we 
learned in Part III, the economic pressures on HFTs operating in a 
competitive market require them to set their spreads at a level such 
that they just break even. 
The increased spreads will be borne by all traders, informed and 
uninformed alike, because the HFTs cannot condition their exchange-
posted limit orders on the identity of the person who sends the 
market orders against which their limit orders execute.92 This means 
informed traders come out ahead: the gains they would have enjoyed 
without the increase in spreads are not fully dissipated by the extra 
they must pay because the spreads in fact are increased. The rest of 
what HFTs need to break even comes from uninformed traders, who 
must pay the increased spread too. 
In sum, without electronic front running, HFTs would find it 
harder to detect indications of possible trading on private information 
and as a result would increase their spreads. Informed traders would 
get all of the gains from being better able to hide the informed nature 
of their trades. But they pay, through the increased spreads, only part 
of the added costs incurred by HFTs as a result of entering into more 
losing transactions. The rest of these added costs are borne by 
uninformed investors, who receive no such benefit. So, electronic 
 
 91. For reasons of expository simplicity, this statement assumes that the increase in spreads 
would not decrease the volume of trading. Therefore, it is assumed that the increase in the 
absolute number of HFT trades with informed traders that would occur from the elimination of 
electronic front running would be the same with the increase in spreads as without. In fact, an 
increase in spreads makes trading more costly, suggesting that the volume would be lower with 
the increase in spreads than without it. This simplification does not alter the basic logic of the 
analysis in the text, however.  
 92. Regulation NMS Rule 610(a) precludes exchanges from restricting access to trading on 
their facilities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2) (2012) (providing that “the rules of [a registered] 
exchange [must] provide that any registered broker or dealer . . . may become a member of such 
exchange”); 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2015) (prohibiting “national securities exchange[s] 
[from] . . . prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing] any person from obtaining efficient access” to trading 
against the buy and sell quotes posted on exchanges). 
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front running benefits uninformed investors and harms informed 
ones. 
c. The ultimate incidence of electronic front running.  Electronic 
front running has been regularly attacked as harming “ordinary 
investors.”93 Our analysis, however, suggests that this attack is 
unmerited. To start, consider retail investors, the paradigmatic 
ordinary investors. Retail investors generally lack any significant 
private information and hence are properly assumed to be 
uninformed. Uninformed investors, as we have just seen, are helped, 
not hurt, by electronic front running. 
Most of the persons whose money is invested in index-based 
mutual funds and pension funds would also presumably count as 
ordinary investors. These entities too, by definition, are uninformed 
traders: their purchases and sales are not prompted by any kind of 
private information. Rather they purchase all the stocks in the index 
when they receive a net inflow of investor funds and sell all stocks in 
the index when the volume of investor redemptions is sufficient to 
result in a net outflow of funds. Again, electronic front running, by 
narrowing spreads and reducing the cost of trading, helps, not hurts, 
these funds and derivatively their ordinary investors. 
What, though, about people who invest in managed mutual or 
pension funds? They too are presumably mostly ordinary persons.94 
These entities do fundamental value research and thus have the 
potential of being informed investors. The analysis above suggests 
that electronic front running hurts informed investors. Though these 
funds can be expected to enjoy gains from the elimination of 
electronic front running, these gains might well not be passed on to 
the ordinary people who invest in them. The investment industry and 
those who work in it each appear to operate in fairly competitive 
markets. To the extent that these markets are in fact competitive, 
much of whatever above-market returns are generated by these 
institutions’ informed trading will be captured in the form of higher 
 
 93. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 104; see also Amended Complaint at 93–95, City of 
Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). 
 94. See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 90 (53d ed. 2013), http://
www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/KWT6-JAN4] (stating that mutual funds 
are primarily owned by individual investors). Indeed, it appears to be these particular ordinary 
investors that Michael Lewis has in mind when arguing that electronic front running takes 
money from ordinary folks on Main Street and gives it to HFTs. See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 81, 
102, 108, 172. 
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fees or salaries for the professionals who make the actual investment 
decisions.95 This suggests that any gains in these entities’ trading 
returns that might result from the elimination of electronic front 
running are likely to go primarily to increase the fees and salaries of 
the professionals who make the actual investment decisions, not to 
the ordinary persons on whose behalf they trade. So even these 
ordinary investors likely are not hurt by electronic front running. 
The beneficiaries of electronic front running, according to the 
critics of the practice, are the exchanges and the HFTs themselves.96 
Here, the critics are closer to the mark. An exchange charges HFTs 
fees for permitting co-location: namely, the right to place the HFT’s 
server very near the exchange’s matching engine.97 If electronic front 
running were eliminated tomorrow, HFT co-location facilities would 
be worth less to the HFTs and they might consequently not be willing 
to pay as much in fees. This might reduce the rents collected by the 
exchanges. Any such reduction in rents would hurt the exchanges, at 
least in the short run.98 The exchange business, however, has become 
much more competitive than in the past, making the exchanges’ 
longer-run ability to collect rents questionable.99 In the longer run, the 
revenues of firms in a competitive industry can be expected to just 
equal their costs, including an ordinary market return on capital. 
Thus, to the extent that the exchange business has in fact become 
competitive, any revenues lost from co-location fees would eventually 
need to be made up through higher charges to investors who trade on 
the exchange. 
 
 95. Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in 
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1271 (2004). 
 96. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 126, 176; see also Amended Complaint at 6, 26, 93–97, 
City of Providence, No. 14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). 
 97. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE PRICE LIST 2015, at 18–20, https://www.nyse.
com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/NYSE_Price_List.pdf [http://perma.cc/GGB9-VYSU] 
(defining co-location fees).  
 98. The impact of eliminating any of these practices, however, is uncertain because HFTs 
desire co-location for a number of reasons. See Charles M. Jones, What Do We Know About 
High-Frequency Trading 10, 26 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper, Paper No. 13-11, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236201 [http://perma.cc/EC79-K4UR] 
(discussing that HFTs seek co-location to minimize their latency in learning of quote changes 
and in altering their quotes and analyzing empirical evidence that the introduction of co-
location improves liquidity). If sophisticated investors extensively use co-location and smart 
routers, it could also reduce, or possibly eliminate, the incidence of electronic front-running. 
 99. Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the Financial Services Industry: Convergence, 
Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 729, 740 (2011) 
(describing competitive pressures driving changes in stock exchanges). 
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Similarly, the lower volume of HFT business that would result 
from the elimination of electronic front running would reduce the 
profits of firms now in the HFT business and thus lower the value of 
their existing assets. But in the longer-run future, investments in the 
industry can be expected to earn a competitive return, with or without 
the practice. Persons with abilities and skills that are uniquely 
valuable to the business of HFTs would, however, suffer both a short- 
and longer-term diminution in their wealth positions from its 
elimination. 
3. Efficiency considerations.  Elimination of electronic front 
running would have three effects in terms of the efficient operation of 
the economy, two of which would appear to be efficiency enhancing 
and one efficiency diminishing. 
a. Improved share price accuracy.  We have just seen that 
informed traders would be net gainers from the elimination of 
electronic front running. Their cost of trading would go up from the 
increase in spreads, but this would be more than compensated for by 
the more advantageous trades they can make with HFTs because of 
the reduced ability of HFTs to detect indications of possible informed 
trading. In the simplified world we are analyzing in this first cut at the 
problem, the only informed traders are persons who trade on 
fundamental value information. These are the speculative investors 
who make money by searching out bits of publicly available 
information, analyzing what has been gathered in a sophisticated way, 
and coming up with a superior estimate of a share issuer’s future cash 
flows than is implied by the current market price of its shares. Hedge 
funds, actively managed mutual funds, pension funds, and 
endowments of nonprofits are examples of such informed traders. 
Because these informed traders buy when their superior estimate 
of share value suggests that a stock is underpriced and sell when it 
indicates a stock is overpriced, their activities make share prices more 
accurate. The elimination of electronic front running would make it 
more profitable for these traders to engage in their activity and so 
they will do more of it. As a result, prices will be more accurate. As 
we have seen, more accurate prices benefit the economy by helping to 
allocate the economy’s scarce capital to the most promising potential 
real investment projects and by improving the utilization of the 
economy’s existing productive capacity through optimizing the signals 
provided to management about investment decisions and the signals 
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given to boards and shareholders about the quality of management 
decisions.100 
b. Reduced resources going to HFT activities.  The second 
positive effect from eliminating electronic front running relates to the 
productive resources that are currently being devoted to undertaking 
the practice, including the skills and abilities of highly sophisticated 
technical personnel, advanced computers, and fiber-optic networks. 
Though HFTs are notoriously secretive, HFT Virtu Financial, Inc. 
(Virtu) did make certain public disclosures in the run up to its now-
postponed IPO.101 In 2013 alone, Virtu reported spending 
approximately $65 million on communication and data processing and 
$78 million on employee compensation and payroll taxes.102 Because 
Virtu has only 151 employees, this means they pay an average salary 
of about $517,000.103 Virtu is just one of several large HFTs and there 
are many smaller ones as well.104 With infrastructure and human 
capital no longer needed to support electronic front running, they 
would be freed up to increase other productive activities in the 
economy. 
c. Allocation of resources over time and allocation of risk.  The 
elimination of electronic front running, by widening spreads, would 
make the market for equities less liquid. This has an unambiguously 
negative effect on the efficient allocation of resources over time. As 
we have seen, the prospect that an issuer’s shares will have less 
 
 100. See supra Part IV.B.1. Implicit in this analysis is that the improvements in the real 
economy from more accurate prices in terms of better capital allocation and better utilization of 
the economy’s existing productive capacity are greater than the value of the additional real 
resources that are brought to the task of gathering and analyzing bits of publicly available 
information. Ample empirical evidence suggests that accurate price signals do in fact have 
efficiency-enhancing effects on managerial decisions. See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 78, at 
361–68 (collecting relevant empirical studies). Theory also suggests that accurate financial 
information will often be underproduced due to its status as a public good. See, e.g., Alex 
Edmans, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of 
Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 938 n.6 (2012). 
 101. See Virtu Financial, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 
(Form S-1) (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1592386/000104746914
002070/a2218589zs-1.htm [http://perma.cc/F38S-CC2D]. 
 102. Id. at 73. 
 103. Id. at 73, 105. 
 104. John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Targets 10 Firms in High Frequency Trading Probe—
SEC Document, REUTERS (July 17, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/
us-sec-investigation-highfrequencytradin-idUSKBN0FM2TW20140717 [http://perma.cc/67AZ-
HX5D] (discussing some of the largest high-frequency trading firms). 
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liquidity in the secondary trading market increases the issuer’s cost of 
capital. Just like a tax, illiquidity results in a wedge between the value 
of what the savers (the purchasers of future dollars) expect to receive 
in the future and what the entrepreneurs or issuers (the suppliers of 
future dollars in the form of future dividend streams) expect to give 
up in the future. This blocks transactions that both parties would 
otherwise have found advantageous if the market for the stock was 
expected to be more liquid, and hence diminishes economic welfare.105 
Less liquidity would similarly have an unambiguously negative 
effect on the efficient allocation of risk. The greater transaction costs 
deter each investor from adjusting as finely her portfolio when 
circumstances alter what would be optimal in terms of diversification 
and suitability to her risk preferences. 
4. Taking other kinds of informed traders into account.  The 
preceding discussion assumes that the only informed traders are ones 
trading on the basis of fundamental value information. In fact, we 
know of two other types of private information that can give a trader 
a significant advantage: announcement information and inside 
information. Taking account of these additional kinds of private 
information does not change the conclusions above that electronic 
front running has positive effects on uninformed investors as well as 
on the efficiency with which risk is allocated and resources are 
allocated over time, nor does it alter the fact that electronic front 
running has negative social effects in terms of the real resources it 
consumes. It also does not change the conclusion that it has a 
negative impact on informed traders as a group. But, depending on 
one’s assessment of the parameters involved, taking account of these 
additional kinds of private information may well change the 
conclusion above concerning the impact of electronic front running 
on fundamental-value-information traders and hence of the practice’s 
impact on price accuracy. 
The issue is as follows. Suppose that electronic front running is 
much more helpful at enabling liquidity suppliers to respond to 
trading based on announcement information and inside information 
than to trading based on fundamental value information. Suppose as 
well that trading on the basis of these other two kinds of information 
constitutes a large portion of all informed trading. Then traders 
informed by these other two types of information will enjoy most of 
 
 105. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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the increased trading gains from the elimination of the practice. If 
electronic front running were eliminated, HFTs would need to 
increase spreads sufficiently to cover their corresponding increased 
trading losses, most of which would be due to inside-information and 
announcement-information traders. With the elimination of 
electronic front running, fundamental-value-information traders will 
thus have to pay as much extra per trade from the increased spread as 
traders on the other two kinds of private information, but will only 
get a small portion of the additional trading gains. It is thus quite 
possible that fundamental-value-information traders will gain less 
than they pay in increased spread and thus will be hurt by the 
elimination of the practice. 
A key factor in determining the likelihood of this possibility is 
the susceptibility of fundamental-value-information trading to 
detection by electronic front running relative to that of trading on the 
basis of the other two kinds of private information. Announcement-
information traders are particularly susceptible because they need to 
do all of their trading in a very short period of time. They therefore 
need to engage in larger transactions, which are easier for HFTs to 
detect and to which it is easier for HFTs to react. Fundamental-value 
traders, in contrast, may often have days to complete their planned 
purchases or sales and can break the total amount they wish to 
transact into small packets that look more like the trades of 
uninformed traders. But we would need to know much more to 
resolve the question definitively. Existing empirical research is not 
very enlightening concerning several other important factors: the 
proportion of informed trades based on each of the three kinds of 
private information, the average value of the information associated 
with each, and the exact sensitivity of the trading patterns associated 
with each of the three kinds of informed traders to detection by 
electronic front running. 
If further empirical research ultimately suggests that electronic 
front running actually helps, not hurts, fundamental-value-
information trading, it would suggest that the practice, contrary to our 
earlier analysis, actually helps share-price accuracy by making the 
business of fundamental-value-information trading more rewarding. 
In contrast, announcement-information trading is not important in 
terms of the social benefits that are derived from share-price accuracy 
because the information will be reflected in price very quickly even 
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without the trading. Inside-information trading is likely not socially 
useful either.106 
B. Slow-Market Arbitrage 
Slow-market arbitrage can occur when an HFT has posted a 
quote representing the NBO or NBB on one exchange, and 
subsequently someone else posts an even better quote on a second 
exchange, which the HFT learns of before it is reported by the 
national system. If, in the short time before the national report 
updates, a marketable order arrives at the first exchange, the order 
will transact against the HFT’s now-stale quote. The HFT, using its 
speed, can then make a riskless profit by turning around and 
transacting against the better quote on the second exchange.107 
Slow-market arbitrage was a target of criticism in Flash Boys,108 
which in turn reflected growing discontent among commentators in 
the years preceding the book’s publication.109 The practice has also 
formed a basis for litigation. For example, in the City of Providence’s 
class action against all the exchanges for their cooperation with HFTs, 
the complaint alleges that HFTs engaged in slow-market arbitrage 
 
 106. Persons trading on the basis of confidential nonpublic information neither worked to 
develop the information, nor paid someone else to work to develop it. Whether these trades are 
legal or not depends on the circumstances, but legality aside, the gain the trader enjoys at the 
expense of other investors would be hard to justify as representing a socially useful incentive. 
Such information usually becomes public relatively quickly and thus would have been reflected 
in price soon anyway. Yet, as we have seen, the existence of the practice of trading on its basis 
decreases liquidity, which discourages the activities of those who trade on the basis of 
information that does take work to develop. So, on a net basis, trading on the basis of nonpublic 
confidential information that took no work to develop is, if anything, likely to be socially 
harmful. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of 
Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On 
Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 
1238–43 (2001).  
 107. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 172 (depicting an example of putative slow-market 
arbitrage). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Tyler Durden, “Do It Yourself” Latency Arbitrage: How HFTs Can 
Manipulate the NBBO at Whim Courtesy of NYSE Empty Quote Gluts, ZEROHEDGE (Aug. 23, 
2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.zerohedge.com/article/do-it-yourself-latency-arbitrage-how-hfts-
can-manipulate-nbbo-whim-courtesy-nyse-quote-stuff [http://perma.cc/G858-EM6F]; Latency 
On Demand?, NANEX (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrash/FlashCrashAnalysis_
LOD.html [http://perma.cc/AD2Y-3Q9G] (discussing discrepancies between NYSE quotes in 
the public quotation system and its private feeds and the potentially manipulative gaming of 
those feeds by HFTs). 
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and claims the practice “generate[d] billions of dollars more a year in 
illicit profits than front-running.”110 
1. An example.  To understand the practice in more detail, let us 
return to our HFT Lightning. Suppose that Lightning has a limit sell 
order for 1,000 shares of IBM at $161.15 posted on NYSE. This quote 
represents the NBO at the moment. Mr. Lowprice then posts a new 
1,000-share sell limit order for IBM on EDGE for $161.13. 
The national reporting system is a bit slow, and so a short period 
of time elapses before it reports Lowprice’s new, better offer. 
Lightning’s co-location facility at EDGE very quickly learns of the 
new $161.13 offer, however, and an algorithm sends an ultra-fast 
message to Lightning’s co-location facility at NYSE informing it of 
the new offer. During the reporting gap, though, Lightning keeps 
posted its $161.15 offer. Next, Ms. Stumble sends a marketable buy 
order to NYSE for 1,000 IBM shares. Lightning’s $161.15 offer 
remains the official NBO, and so Stumble’s order transacts against it. 
Lightning’s co-location facility at NYSE then sends an ultra-fast 
message to the one at EDGE instructing it to submit a 1,000-share 
marketable buy order there. This buy order transacts against 
Lowprice’s $161.13 offer. Thus, within the short period before the 
new $161.13 offer is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to sell 
1,000 IBM shares at $161.15 and purchase them at $161.13, for what 
appears to be a $20.00 profit. 
It is worth noting that the first step in this story—Lowprice’s 
posting of the $161.13 offer on EDGE—does not guarantee that 
Lightning can make this profit. No marketable buy order may arrive 
at NYSE during the reporting gap. Also, even if one does, by the time 
Lightning is able to submit its marketable buy order at EDGE, some 
other person may already have submitted a buy marketable order to 
EDGE that picks off the $161.13 offer. This becomes particularly 
likely if, as is the case in the real world, there are a number of HFTs 
besides Lightning with co-location facilities at EDGE and at the other 
exchanges. Depending on the nature of their own respective offers 
posted on various exchanges, one or more of these other HFTs may 
be competing with Lightning to pick off the one $161.13 offer. 
 
 110. Amended Complaint at 6, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-
2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). 
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2. Wealth-transfer effects.  Who is helped and who is hurt in the 
example above and what are the larger distributive consequences 
with slow-market arbitrage as an ongoing practice? In the example, 
the first thing to note is that Ms. Stumble, the person who, during the 
reporting gap, submits the marketable order that transacts against 
Lightning’s stale $161.15 offer, is not harmed by Lightning’s slow-
market arbitrage activities. Stumble would have suffered the same 
fate if Lightning had not engaged in slow-market arbitrage because 
that course of action would have also left the $161.15 offer posted on 
NYSE and so Stumble’s buy order would still have transacted against 
it. 
Still, someone must be worse off: Lightning is better off than if it 
had not engaged in the slow-market arbitrage, and trading is a zero-
sum game. To see who this worse-off person might be, consider first 
why Lightning is better off. Lightning is in the business of buying and 
selling shares, not holding on to long or short positions for any 
significant period of time. So it needs to reverse quickly each 
transaction it enters. Here, it sold shares when Stumble’s order 
transacted against Lightning’s $161.15 offer on NYSE. To reverse this 
transaction, Lightning needed to buy shares. By engaging in slow-
market arbitrage, it did so by seizing the best offer in the market—
Lowprice’s $161.13 offer on EDGE—before others in the market 
even knew the offer was available. If Lightning had not detected this 
new offer ahead of others and seized it, Lightning’s reversal of the 
situation would occur through posting a bid that a marketable order 
transacts against. We know from Part III that the sale of the shares at 
$161.15 and their repurchase at this newly posted bid would each, on 
an expected basis, be a break-even transaction. By successfully 
engaging in slow-market arbitrage, Lightning instead made a certain 
$.02 profit per share sold and purchased. 
To figure out who is hurt from Lightning engaging in slow-
market arbitrage—that is, detecting the $161.13 offer and seizing it—
consider who would have been better off if Lightning had posted a 
new buy limit order instead of seizing Lowprice’s $161.13 offer. The 
person or persons helped would come from one of two groups of 
potential liquidity takers. One group is potential sellers who submit 
marketable sell orders: the posted bid that Lightning would need 
filled would improve the terms for the marginal seller. The other 
group is potential buyers who submit marketable buy orders: the 
opportunity by members of this group to seize Lowprice’s $161.13 
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015  1:17 PM 
2015] THE NEW STOCK MARKET 241 
offer, which was better than anything else available in the market at 
the time, would improve terms for the marginal buyer. 
The results from this example can be generalized. The persons 
who are hurt by HFTs engaging in the practice of slow-market 
arbitrage on an ongoing basis are regular traders, both informed and 
uninformed ones.111 In contrast to electronic front running, in which 
the practice decreases the effective cost of trading for uninformed 
traders but increases it for informed traders, slow-market arbitrage 
increases the effective cost of trading for all regular traders. 
3. Efficiency considerations.  In most situations, arbitrage 
activities, at least if they do not consume any real resources, have 
positive economic-welfare effects. The actions of arbitrageurs 
equilibrate prices in two markets, each of which has its own group of 
potential participants, and as a result, presumptively welfare-
enhancing transactions are entered into that otherwise would not 
have occurred.112 However, as the example shows, slow-market 
arbitrage has little in common with ordinary arbitrage. Slow-market 
arbitrage adds a third party, the liquidity supplier, whose only social 
purpose is to facilitate trades between regular traders but who instead 
is the only gainer from the so-called arbitrage activity. Regular 
traders, both informed and uninformed, are in fact losers because 
their cost of trading goes up. So the normal presumption in favor of 
activities carrying the label “arbitrage” does not apply here. 
In fact, even if slow-market arbitrage consumed no real 
resources, it would have an unambiguously negative impact on 
welfare. Consider first the effect of the increased effective cost of 
trading for informed traders. Slow-market arbitrage, by raising the 
effective cost of trading for informed traders, makes it less rewarding 
 
 111. In the example, if Lightning did not engage in slow-market arbitrage, it is possible that 
it would be another HFT engaging in slow-market arbitrage, not an ordinary trader, who would 
transact against the $161.13 offer. The ultimate question we are asking, however, is what would 
happen if no HFT engaged in the practice. 
 112. The arbitrageurs do this by buying in the low-price market, thereby putting upward 
pressure on the price there, and selling the same item in the high-price market, thereby putting 
downward pressure on the price there. As a result, there is a group of potential sellers in the 
initially low-price market who would not find it worthwhile to sell at the initial lower price, but 
who do find it worthwhile to sell at the higher equilibrating price. And there is a group of 
potential buyers in the initially high-price market that are in the exact mirror image situation. 
The transactions entered into by these two groups of people, which would not occur but for 
arbitrage, are presumptively welfare enhancing because they are entered into voluntarily by 
both parties to each of the transactions.  
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 1:17 PM 
242 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:191 
to seek out bits of publicly available information and to analyze their 
implications in a sophisticated way. This reduces share-price accuracy, 
which, as we have seen, would in turn have negative effects on the 
allocation of capital for new real investment projects and the efficient 
utilization of existing productive capacity. As for the increased 
effective cost of trading on uninformed traders, it has the now-
familiar negative effects on the efficient allocation of resources over 
time and on the efficient allocation of risk.113 
Slow-market arbitrage in fact does consume real resources, 
which is another efficiency consideration. If it were the only HFT 
practice dependent on co-location facilities and ultra-fast connections, 
it would use substantial amounts of real resources that could 
otherwise be usefully employed increasing the production of other 
goods and services. If HFTs were to continue the practice of 
electronic front running, however, the marginal cost in real resources 
of engaging in slow-market arbitrage as well is probably fairly low. 
C. HFT Exploitation of Midpoint Orders 
A trader will often submit to a dark pool a “midpoint” limit buy 
or sell order, the terms of which are that it will execute against the 
next marketable order with the opposite interest to arrive at the pool 
and will do so at a price equal to the midpoint between the best 
publicly reported bid and offer at the time of execution.114 Midpoint 
orders appear to have the advantage of allowing a buyer to buy at 
well below the best offer and sell well above the best bid. It has been 
noted for a number of years, however, that traders who post such 
orders are vulnerable to the activities of HFTs,115 a point that was also 
picked up in Flash Boys.116 Midpoint-order exploitation again involves 
an HFT detecting an improvement in the best available bid or offer 
on one of the exchanges before the new quote is publicly reported. 
The HFT puts in an order to transact against the new improved 
quote, and then sends an order reversing the transaction to a dark 
 
 113. See supra IV.B.2. 
 114. Robert P. Bartlett, III & Justin McCrary, Dark Trading at the Midpoint: Pricing Rules, 
Order Flow and Price Discovery 5 (Feb. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.stern.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2%20Bartlett%20and%20McCrary%20Shall%20
We%20Haggle.pdf [http://perma.cc/87G8-DFVB].  
 115. See, e.g., Alex Paley, Navigating the Dark Pool Landscape, in ACCESSING 
FRAGMENTED LIQUIDITY 46 (2010), https://autobahn.db.com/microSite/docs/Navigating_Dark_
Pool_Landscape.pdf [http://perma.cc/8LC3-NVTA]. 
 116. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 113–18. 
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pool that contains midpoint limit orders with the opposite interest 
that transact at a price equal to the midpoint between the now-stale 
best publicly reported bid and offer.117 
1. An example.  Let us bring back again our HFT, Lightning. 
Suppose that the NBB and NBO for IBM are $161.11 and $161.15, 
respectively, and each are for 1,000 shares and are posted on NYSE 
by HFTs other than Lightning. Then the $161.15 offer is cancelled 
and a new 1,000-share offer is submitted at $161.12. Lightning, 
through its co-location facilities at NYSE, learns of these changes in 
advance of their being publicly reported. During the reporting gap, 
the official NBO remains $161.15. 
Lightning knows that midpoint orders for IBM are often posted 
on Opaque, a well-known dark pool, and Lightning programs its 
algorithms accordingly. Because Opaque does not disclose what is in 
its limit order book, Lightning cannot know, however, whether at this 
moment any such orders are posted on Opaque, and, if there are, 
whether they are buy orders or sell orders. Still Lightning has a 
chance to make money. 
Using an ultra-fast connection between the co-location facility at 
NYSE and Opaque, a sell limit order for 1,000 shares at $161.13 is 
sent to Opaque with the condition attached that it cancel if it does not 
transact immediately (a so-called “IOC” order). This way, if there 
was at least one midpoint buy limit order posted at Opaque for IBM, 
it will execute against Lightning’s order at $161.13, halfway between 
the now-stale, but still official, NBB of $161.11 and NBO of $161.15. 
If there are no such midpoint buy orders posted at Opaque, nothing is 
lost. 
Assume that at least one such midpoint buy order exists 
aggregating to at least 1,000 shares so that Lightning’s sell order of 
1,000 shares transacts at $161.13. Lightning’s co-location facility at 
NYSE is informed of this fact through Lightning’s ultra-fast 
connection with Opaque. A marketable buy order for 1,000 shares is 
sent almost instantaneously to NYSE, which transacts against the new 
$161.12 offer. Thus, within the short period before the new $161.12 
offer on NYSE is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to 
execute against this offer, purchase 1,000 IBM shares at $161.12, and 
sell them at $161.13, for what appears to be a $10.00 profit. 
 
 117. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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2. Wealth-transfer and efficiency considerations.  The regular 
practice of HFT exploitation of dark pool midpoint orders provides 
rents to HFTs—they are able to make profitable trades they 
otherwise would not be able to do. This activity yields no prosocial 
incentive effect because it is unrelated to the positive social function 
we have attributed to HFTs: providing liquidity in a world with both 
uninformed and informed traders. Because trading is a zero-sum 
game, if the HFTs gain, certain regular traders must lose. Because of 
the practice, the expected cost of trading using midpoint orders in a 
dark pool goes up. This would hurt those who are deterred from using 
dark pool midpoint orders because of this higher cost of trading, as 
well as those who still do use them but have to incur these higher 
costs. 
The efficiency effects of the practice closely resemble the 
efficiency effects of the abuses by investment banks and dark-pool 
operators that are the subject of later discussion.118 Suffice it to say 
here, dark pools are a place for uninformed traders to lower their cost 
of trading by finding other uninformed traders with which to trade. 
Midpoint exploitation undermines their ability to do this at least to 
some extent. The practice increases the effective cost of trading for 
those uninformed traders who use dark pools. This hurts not only 
those who use dark pools despite the higher effective cost of trading 
but also those who would have used them but for this higher cost. For 
the same reasons as discussed with respect to the earlier practices, this 
will reduce the efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time 
and the allocation of risk in the economy. At the same time, as 
discussed more fully below, to the extent that the practice steers more 
uninformed traders to trade in the exchanges, it leads to a narrowing 
of spreads on the exchanges, thereby reducing the cost of 
fundamental value information trading and thus improving share-
price accuracy. 
D. High-Frequency Trading and Volatility 
Though much of the controversy about high-frequency traders 
has focused on their trading strategies, a different, but also important, 
strain of criticism has alleged a causal connection between HFT 
activity and greater volatility in equity markets.119 
 
 118. See infra Part V.E. 
 119. See, e.g., Bob Dannhauser, Debating Michael Lewis’ ‘Flash Boys’: High-Frequency 
Trading Not All Bad, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/
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1. General increase in volatility.  One criticism is that HFTs have 
made the markets more volatile on an ongoing basis month in and 
month out. Michael Lewis, in Flash Boys, for example, asserts that 
the intraday price volatility of the stock market was 40 percent 
greater between 2010 and 2013 than it was between 2004 and 2006, 
and associates this change with the enactment of Regulation NMS 
and the rise of HFTs.120 
Lewis’s use of this comparison to draw an inference about HFTs’ 
influence on volatility seems deeply mistaken. One big problem is 
that the years 2004–2006 are a poor comparison sample because they 
had uncharacteristically low volatility, below any other two-year 
period from 1998 to 2012.121 Another big problem is that the years 
2010–2013 are also uncharacteristic, as they followed the most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression and would be expected to 
show high volatility due to the increased uncertainty associated with 
the fundamental values of securities.122 A better comparison sample 
would be 2012 to the present, which shows market volatility that is 
generally lower than the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the greatly 
increased role of HFTs in the latter period. As one prominent article 
has noted, current “[i]ntra-day volatility is below the levels of the pre-
electronic 1990s.”123 As best one can tell so far, no serious evidence 
shows a causal link between the rise of HFTs and ongoing increased 
volatility. HFTs rose to prominence during a period of greater 
volatility, which was due to extraneous causes rather than the HFTs 
themselves. In addition, no general theoretical reasons give rise to an 
expectation of greater volatility due to HFT activity. Instead, the 
 
article/2129253-debating-michael-lewis-flash-boys-high-frequency-trading-not-all-bad [http://
perma.cc/R4K3-46YB] (describing flash crashes as “disconcerting and damaging to investor 
trust”); Kit R. Roane, How NYSE Plans to Use ‘Flash Crash’ to Reclaim Its Glory, CNN 
MONEY (May 12, 2010, 9:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/12/markets/NYSE_flash_crash.
fortune/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Z5GG-UT5X] (reporting attempts by NYSE executives to 
connect HFTs with the flash crash). 
 120. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 112. 
 121. FABIO PANETTA, ET AL., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE RECENT BEHAVIOUR 
OF FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITY 1 (2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap29.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SX42-V3JF]. 
 122. See ANGEL ET AL., supra note 29, at 11–12; see also John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, 
Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical 
Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 1 (2001) (finding significant spikes in volatility 
during periods of major economic crisis). 
 123. ANGEL ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.  
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majority of academic evidence on the subject suggests that HFTs 
reduce volatility.124 
2. The Flash Crash.  More interesting is a second claim: that 
HFTs exacerbate volatility in a very extreme manner when there has 
been some kind of disruption in the market, such as the infamous 
May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash.” The Flash Crash occurred within a 
window of less than thirty minutes during which the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA)—a benchmark of general market 
performance—dropped about 1,000 points, losing 9 percent of its 
value, and then recovered almost its entire loss.125 In this incident, the 
DJIA suffered the greatest one-hour decline in its history,126 and 
several individual stocks displayed astonishing volatility. Accenture, 
for instance, fell from trading at $39.98 at 2:46 p.m. to one cent at 2:49 
p.m., only to return to $39.51 by 2:50 p.m.127 Apple, as another 
example, at one moment traded for almost $100,000 per share.128  
The Flash Crash was widely taken to “highlight[] the risks of 
electronic trading” as NYSE’s then-head of operations suggested.129 In 
 
 124. See, e.g., Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 646, 
648 (2013) (finding that HFT activity reduces volatility); Jonathan Brogaard, Thibaut Moyaert 
& Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Market Stability 1–2 (May 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETI
NGS/2014-Rome/papers/EFMA2014_0242_fullpaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/DUG7-UQFT]. But 
see Sandrine Jacob Leal, Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini & Giorgio Fagiolo, Rock 
Around the Clock: An Agent-Based Model of Low- and High-Frequency Trading 3 (Université 
Nice Sophia Antipolis GREDEG Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2014-21, Jan. 
2014), http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2014-21.pdf [http://perma.cc/
UQF5-WYUW]. 
 125. STAFFS OF THE CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 
6, 2010, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter FLASH CRASH REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC3Y-XTP8]; Alexandra Twin, Glitches Send Dow on 
Wild Ride, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/markets/
markets_newyork [http://perma.cc/KE3Y-Z272]. 
 126. Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1,010.14-Point Trip, 
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870437070
4575227754131412596 [http://perma.cc/VEN2-XA2H]. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Tom Lauricella & Scott Patterson, Legacy of the ‘Flash Crash’: Enduring Worries of 
Repeat, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274
8704545004575353443450790402 [http://perma.cc/2XXJ-MSLY]. Many of the most outlandish 
transactions executed during the Flash Crash were later cancelled or “broken” by regulators. 
See Brian Korm & Bryan Y.M. Tham, Why We Could Easily Have Another Flash Crash, 
FORBES (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/08/09/why-
we-could-easily-have-another-flash-crash [http://perma.cc/WXGA-XG8W]. 
 129. Lauricella & McKay, supra note 126 (quoting Louis Pastina, executive vice president 
and head of operations at NYSE Euronext’s New York Stock Exchange). 
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the years since, blame has been persistently attributed to HFTs and 
commentators have suggested that HFTs generally increase the 
severity of market crashes.130 The report eventually issued by federal 
regulators, however, explained the Flash Crash not as the result of 
HFT predation, but as the result of a liquidity crisis caused by a large 
sell order that triggered a flight of liquidity from the market. This 
flight involved HFTs, but only in the sense that many HFTs are 
market makers that left the market in response to the large sell 
order.131 This temporary disappearance of the HFTs removed 
substantial liquidity.132 
The crucial question is: Why would a large market sell order 
trigger a flight by HFTs, when the business of HFTs is to provide 
liquidity to persons submitting marketable orders? The answer to this 
question returns us to the overarching theme of this Article—that 
comprehension and intelligent regulation of the modern stock market 
is impossible without a thorough appreciation for the role of adverse 
selection in shaping the provision of liquidity.133 Volatility of the kind 
involved in the Flash Crash is directly connected to adverse selection. 
The reason is that a large, aggressive sell (or buy) order suggests to 
liquidity providers that the order submitter may have important 
private information. HFTs know that if this apparent private 
information in fact turns out to exist, then they will lose money from 
trading with that order and so they will widen their spreads.134 If the 
threat of being adversely selected by the order becomes extreme 
enough, many or all liquidity providers will temporarily exit from the 
market altogether and prices will, as a result, fluctuate widely in the 
absence of quotes reflecting any plausible estimate of a security’s 
 
 130. See, e.g., Michael Ono, High Frequency Trading May Magnify Market Woes, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/high-frequency-trading-accelerating-
market-woes/story?id=14280847 [http://perma.cc/44XN-Q68A] (suggesting that “computer-
driven high frequency trading is partially responsible for accelerating stock gyrations”); Andrew 
Smith, Fast Money: The Battle Against the High Frequency Traders, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 
2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/07/inside-murky-world-high-
frequency-trading [http://perma.cc/4NY8-37HA]. 
 131. Andrei A. Kirilenko, Albert S. Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi & Tugkan Tuzun, The Flash 
Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market 25–26 (Sept. 24, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686004 [http://
perma.cc/N8CQ-X82Z]. 
 132. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 6. 
 133. This Article focuses on HFTs as liquidity providers, and ample evidence shows that 
they play this role. See, e.g., Menkveld, supra note 22, at 712.  
 134. See supra Part III.B. 
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fundamental value.135 This, in essence, is what happened on a large 
scale during the Flash Crash. 
The behavior of HFTs during the Flash Crash was not predatory; 
it was simply unheroic. Perceiving the large sell order to have a higher 
probability of being motivated by private information, given its size 
and aggressiveness,136 HFTs removed their quotes to minimize their 
trading losses, and liquidated the long positions they had 
accumulated, exacerbating pressures on price declines.137 Because 
HFTs provide a large share of liquidity, in their absence, the only 
quotes left lay far from the true price of a security; that is, the present 
value of its future cash flows.138 
3. Wealth-transfer considerations.  Assessing the wealth transfers 
resulting from gyrations, such as in the Flash Crash, is equivalent to 
asking who wins and loses when HFTs stop providing liquidity. 
Despite suggestions by critics of predatory behavior, HFTs cannot 
make money if they do not trade. Among traders, the losers are 
persons who put in market sell orders for stocks that temporarily 
went way down and market buy orders for stocks that temporarily 
went way up. The winners were the persons who posted previously 
way-out-of-the-money limit orders against which these market orders 
transacted. 
4. Efficiency considerations.  Events such as the Flash Crash seem 
bound to occur from time to time with an HFT-dominated system for 
providing liquidity. The old NYSE specialist system, in which the 
specialist was supposed to “lean against the wind” to provide liquidity 
may have been less prone to such problems. So perhaps was the 
dealer system more generally, in which human beings made the 
trading decisions. These occasional brief moments of total collapse of 
liquidity do not really seem very important in terms of our 
touchstones for efficiency, however. Very brief sharp deviations of 
share prices from fundamental values do not seriously undermine the 
 
 135. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 2–3. 
 136. See David Easley, Marcos M. López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara, The Microstructure 
of the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes, and the Probability of Informed Trading, 
37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 118, 120–26 (2011) (suggesting that order flow was especially informed 
and hence toxic for market makers in the period preceding the Flash Crash). 
 137. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 29; see Jones, supra note 98, at 26. 
 138. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 45–57; see FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 78, 
at 2 (discussing the “fundamental value” of a security as a market consensus about its 
appropriate price). 
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role of share prices in aiding the efficiency with which capital is 
allocated to new real investment projects and with which existing 
productive capacity is utilized. Accuracy most of the time is what 
matters. And investors can protect themselves from extreme results 
by using orders with limits that would appear to make them 
marketable. They can stay briefly out of the market without seriously 
undermining the efficient allocation of resources over time or the 
efficient allocation of risk. The modern stock market’s overall 
performance in terms of liquidity provision and operational costs is 
far better than the market of the past, which matters more for the 
ultimate social goals promoted by a well-functioning equity market. 
E. Dark Pools and the Fate of Customer Orders 
The next two controversial practices involve the fate of customer 
orders that end up in dark pools.139 The first alleged practice involves 
large investment banks, which are both important providers of 
brokerage services and operators of most of the largest dark pools.140 
They are accused of routing their brokerage customers’ orders to the 
banks’ own dark pools even when the orders will receive inferior 
execution there.141 Related to this first practice is the claim that it is 
common for a dark-pool operator to misrepresent the nature of other 
parties’ trading in its pool in order to induce brokerage customers to 
agree to have their orders sent to this pool. 
 
 139. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, As Market Heats Up, Trading Slips into Shadows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at B1; Shining a Light on Dark Pools, THE ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER 
(Aug. 18, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/08/exchange-share-
trading [http://perma.cc/22EM-RGS7]; David Zeiler, How High-Frequency Traders Use Dark 
Pools to Cheat Investors, MONEY MORNING (Apr. 22, 2014), http://moneymorning.com/2014/04/
22/how-high-frequency-traders-use-dark-pools-to-cheat-investors [http://perma.cc/V6LL-6VSX] 
(discussing how HFTs may be abusing dark pool access). 
 140. An underlying premise of these criticisms is that the largest investment banks are also 
among the most prominent brokers and dark-pool operators. For instance, Michael Lewis often 
discusses dark pools as being operated by Wall Street banks, which is accurate—six of the ten 
largest dark pools are run by major investment banks. See RHODRI PREECE, CFA INST., DARK 
POOLS, INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MARKET QUALITY 14–15 (2012). All of the ten 
largest brokers on NYSE are also global investment banks. See NYSE Broker Volume, NYSE 
MARKET DATA, http://www.nyxdata.com [http://perma.cc/YC2V-XUAG]. 
 141. Michael Lewis, for example, claims that dark-pool operators sell access to their trading 
venues to HFTs—without disclosing this practice to other users—and that these HFTs then 
exploit other traders. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 123. Inferior execution could also occur on a dark 
pool if the counterparties trading there were especially informed or were given information 
about the existence of the customer limit orders posted there. 
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The second alleged practice involves large investment banks 
ignoring their brokerage customers’ instructions to direct their orders 
to specific venues, and instead routing the orders to their own dark 
pools, where, again they receive an inferior execution.142 The market 
may not solve the problem, critics of the practice continue, because 
customers have difficulty detecting the practice and, even when they 
do, the customers are reluctant to switch brokers because of their 
dependence on soft-money services the banks provide their most 
loyal customers.143 
Dark-pool operators have been no strangers to legal actions 
involving allegations that they have engaged in these kinds of 
practices. The SEC has brought a number of successful proceedings 
against dark-pool operators.144 Most recently, New York Attorney 
General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit against Barclays alleging 
that Barclays’ dark pool, Barclays LX (then the second largest in the 
United States) misrepresented to users the involvement of HFTs in 
LX; the informational advantages given to HFTs; and that Barclays, 
as a broker, impartially sought to route orders for best execution, 
when it actually disproportionately routed client orders to its own 
pool.145 
We do not know whether any of these practices is in fact 
widespread. As discussed below, they are clearly illegal and their 
wealth-transfer and efficiency effects appear completely negative. We 
will suggest in Part VI some policy reforms that would make 
enforcement more effective if, despite the illegality of these practices, 
evidence emerges that they are in fact widespread. 
1. Understanding the function of dark pools.  Recall that a dark 
pool, like an exchange, is typically an electronic limit order book, but, 
unlike an exchange, it does not publicly reveal the limit orders that 
are posted on it.146 Moreover, it has the ability to restrict who can post 
 
 142. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 182–87, 264–65. 
 143. Id. at 102–03, 214–15. 
 144. See, e.g., Liquidnet Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 72,339, 2014 WL 2547522 (June 6, 
2014); Pipeline Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038 (Oct. 24, 
2011). 
 145. Complaint at 2–4, Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital, Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2014). 
 146. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b)(1) (2015) (defining scope of reporting requirements); id. 
§ 242.600(b)(65) (defining broker-dealer); id. § 242.600(b)(73)(ii)(A) (defining subject security). 
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limit orders and submit marketable orders.147 Dark pools, despite their 
nefarious-sounding moniker, can provide useful, legitimate services to 
their customers. They arose because of the more liberal regulatory 
environment established by the NMS Amendments to the Exchange 
Act and the information-technology revolution. The key force driving 
their rise—as with so many other institutions and practices within the 
new stock market—was concern to mitigate adverse selection. A dark 
pool’s most valuable characteristic, from this perspective, is to 
provide a venue where uninformed buyers and sellers, seeking to 
trade substantial amounts of stock, can minimize the movement of 
prices against them and transact at prices potentially much better 
than the NBO and NBB.148 These advantages arise from the fact that 
quotes on a dark pool are not publicly displayed and because dark-
pool operators have the ability to exclude traders. 
In terms of serving these functions, the ideal dark pool would be 
one in which both the parties posting limit midpoint orders and 
parties sending in marketable orders are completely uninformed. The 
midpoint is a substantially better price for the buyer than the NBO, 
and it is the same for the seller relative to the NBB. The system 
begins to break down to the extent that the parties posting limit 
orders are in fact informed. This is because their counterparties—the 
parties submitting marketable orders—would be disadvantaged by 
being in a dark pool because they would not be able to see from the 
size of the posted limit orders that an informed party might be on the 
other side. It similarly begins to break down to the extent that the 
parties submitting the marketable orders are informed. This is 
because they will only transact against the limit orders in the dark 
pool when their information suggests that the midpoint is a price that 
makes the transaction advantageous to them, which means it is a price 
that makes the transaction disadvantageous to the person posting the 
limit offer. Thus, the dark-pool operator provides a service to the 
extent that it can effectively monitor both the parties posting the 
 
 147. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule 301(b)(5), 17 
C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (2015); Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3614 (proposed Jan. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 242) (“As [trading systems] that are exempt from exchange registration, [off-
exchange platforms] are not required to provide fair access [to all traders] unless they reach a 
5% trading volume threshold in a stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result, 
access to . . . [these platforms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”). 
 148. See, e.g., PREECE, supra note 140, at 12–13.  
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midpoint limit orders and the parties sending in marketable orders to 
assure that each side is relatively unlikely to be informed.149 
2. Wealth-transfer and efficiency considerations.  To the extent 
that a dark pool does not function in accordance with the ideal 
described above, an order sent there may execute at less-desirable 
terms than if it were sent to another venue. An investment bank that 
operates a dark pool has intimate knowledge of the extent to which it 
in fact falls short of this ideal. If a brokerage unit of an investment 
bank sends a trader’s order to the bank’s own dark pool when the 
broker knows, or should know, that the order would receive superior 
execution elsewhere, the bank gains from the extra volume of trade in 
its dark pool and in other possible ways,150 and the customer loses 
from the inferior terms of execution. The same result is likely to arise 
if the trader, having tried to determine where its order is most likely 
to get best execution, instructs its broker that the order be sent to a 
venue other than the bank’s dark pool, but the instruction is ignored. 
The same result is also likely if the bank operating the dark pool 
misrepresents to customers the nature of the parties allowed to trade 
on the bank’s dark pool, in order to create the impression that there 
exists less danger of informed counterparties there than is in fact the 
case. Such a misrepresentation is likely to attract orders that could 
execute on better terms elsewhere. All of these results generalize if 
these failures are common practices: they make investment banks 
richer and traders poorer. 
At the simplest level, the negative efficiency consequences 
arising from these broker or dark-pool-operator failures are the same 
as the efficiency justifications more generally for legal remedies 
against those who breach contracts or engage in misrepresentation. A 
broker has a duty of best execution in the way it routes a customer’s 
order.151 This requires the broker to exercise “reasonable diligence to 
 
 149. The operator provides a similar service to the extent that it keeps out HFTs that engage 
in midpoint order exploitation. 
 150. A broker can make money off transactions occurring on its dark pool for several 
additional reasons. If it is executing marketable orders on its dark pool, then a broker will 
receive its commission without having to subtract the taker fee charged marketable orders on 
most exchanges. If the broker is internalizing orders on its own dark pool and transacting 
against them as principal, then it can make half the spread on each trade. Even more nefarious 
inducements are suggested by the criticisms, such as exploitation of orders by a broker’s HFT 
affiliate that has improperly been given details about orders. 
 151. This duty exists both as a matter of state common law of agency and under the rules of 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Sec. Litig., 911 F. 
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ascertain the best market” for a transaction to ensure an order 
receives a price “as favorable as possible under prevailing market 
conditions.”152 In essence, the duty of best execution is a default term 
in the contract between the broker and its customer. Its violation 
leads to the same efficiency concerns that any other breach would: 
that the parties voluntarily entered into the transaction no longer 
leads to the presumption that it can be expected to advance the 
interests of both and that it is thus efficiency enhancing. The same 
analysis applies to a broker disregarding customer instructions as to 
where to route an order, which is also clearly illegal.153 When a 
misrepresentation induces a party to enter a contract—in this case 
agreeing to have an order sent to a dark pool that has different 
counterparties than represented—the same problem is again created: 
the transaction no longer carries the presumption of being efficiency 
enhancing. Finally, if an investment bank that is both a broker and a 
dark-pool operator provides information concerning a customer 
order to its trading affiliates (or anyone else), it would be violating its 
agency duties of confidentiality, provisions of Regulation ATS, and 
probably its own marketing material.154 Again, one can view these 
duties as default provisions in a contract, the breach of which robs the 
transaction of the presumption that it is efficiency enhancing. 
 
Supp 754, 760 (D.N.J. 1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing fiduciary duties of brokers); id. at 
769 (“A broker-dealer’s duty to seek to obtain the best execution of customer orders derives 
from the common law agency [duty] of loyalty . . . .” (quoting DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, 
supra note 28, at V-1)); see also DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, supra note 28, at 21 (“A broker-
dealer has a duty to seek to obtain the best execution for its customer orders.”).  
 152. FINRA Rules, supra note 87, at Rule 5310(a)(1). Reasonable diligence requires a 
broker to consider “the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility, relative 
liquidity, and pressure on available communications)”; “the size and type of transaction”; “the 
number of markets checked”; the “accessibility of the quotation”; and “the terms and conditions 
of the order which result in the transaction, as communicated to the member and persons 
associated with the member.” Id. at Rule 5310(a)(1)(A)–(E).  
 153. Ignoring a principal’s instructions would violate the agent’s duties noted above as well 
as an agent’s specific duty of obedience to the principal. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Coombs, 654 
N.E.2d 54, 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (discussing agent’s duty of obedience). Though many retail 
brokers do not provide customers any choice as to execution venue, some do, and brokers for 
institutional customers would be expected to provide options in this respect. See, e.g., 
SmartRouting, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=16
85 [http://perma.cc/K5H7-DAPM] (providing comparison of security prices offered by 
Interactive Brokers versus industry average). 
 154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006) (outlining agent’s duty of 
confidentiality). Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS requires an alternative trading system 
(ATS) (essentially, a nonexchange stock-market trading venue, such as a dark pool) to protect 
users’ confidential information. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10) (2014). 
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If we look at the efficiency question from the more nuanced 
mode of inquiry that we have been generally using in this Article, the 
story becomes a bit more complicated. If these practices are in fact 
widespread, then they increase the effective costs of trading for those 
uninformed traders whose orders go to dark pools. They also 
discourage some traders from using dark pools who would use them, 
and who would enjoy lower costs of trading as a result, if these 
practices did not occur. For the same reasons as discussed with 
respect to the earlier HFT practices, these effects will reduce the 
efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time and the 
allocation of risk in the economy. 
On the other hand, these practices often probably improve 
share-price accuracy and hence enhance the real economic-efficiency 
effects that flow from that. This is true to the extent that informed 
investors get advantages trading in dark pools because these practices 
lower their cost of trading. It is also true to the extent that 
uninformed investors are scared off from the dark pools because of 
these practices. When more uninformed investors instead trade on 
exchanges, the spreads are lower for informed investors. The 
uninformed investors trading on exchanges subsidize informed 
investors and this subsidy encourages those in the business of 
generating and trading on fundamental value information. Even if the 
positive efficiency effects from the practices dominate the negative 
ones, however, which we have no reason to believe, we would not 
recommend abandoning the traditional rules of upright commercial 
practice that are breached by these practices. Other methods exist for 
achieving the same thing, for example by prohibiting or limiting dark 
pools.155 
F. Maker-Taker and Taker-Maker Fees 
Recall that “maker-taker fees” refer to a situation in which a 
trading venue pays a fee (a rebate to the broker) for each 
nonmarketable limit order it receives that is ultimately executed, and 
charges a fee to the broker for each marketable order it receives that 
executes against a limit order posted on the venue. With “taker-
 
 155. See Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ 
Stock Prices, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 25–27, 44–45), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410422 [http://perma.cc/FF72-HEAC] (arguing 
that off-exchange trading venues increase the probability of adverse selection on exchanges). 
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maker fees” the venue does the opposite.156 In a typical maker-taker 
structure, a venue charges in the range of $.0025–$.0030 per share for 
marketable orders and pays rebates for executed nonmarketable 
orders in the range of $.0020–$.0025 per share.157 In contrast, the 
taker-maker scheme will typically charge executed nonmarketable 
limit orders $.0007–$.0010 per share and rebate $.0002–$.0005. The 
actual fees and rebates vary somewhat across exchanges and vary 
through time,158 but under either scheme the venue typically nets in 
the neighborhood of $.0005 per share. 
The maker-taker and taker-maker fee structures have been 
subject to vigorous criticism. In a letter to the SEC, Senator Charles 
Schumer argued that they “create[d] a conflict of interest, as brokers 
may be incentivized to execute trades on a particular venue even if 
that venue is not offering the best price,” creating “room for brokers 
to arguably put their own interests ahead of their clients by 
maximizing the rebates they receive from exchanges.”159 Senator Carl 
Levin, asking a TD Ameritrade executive about the fact that TD 
Ameritrade had directed virtually all nonmarketable orders to a 
single trading venue, which happened to offer the highest rebate for 
such orders, suggested, “[y]our subjective judgment as to which 
market provided best execution for tens of millions of customer 
orders a year allowed you to route all of the orders to the market that 
paid you the most . . . . I find that to be a frankly pretty incredible 
coincidence.”160 Since those hearings, a class-action lawsuit has been 
 
 156. See supra Part II.C.7. 
 157. See generally Lawrence E. Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing Effects on Market Quotations 
2 (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.securitiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/
speech/hujibusiness_Maker-taker.pdf [http://perma.cc/DP97-SCJP] (discussing typical maker-
taker pricing scheme). 
 158. The actual fees and rebates imposed must be publicly available and must be the same 
across all stocks traded on the exchange. The fees and rebates for any exchange are available on 
the exchange’s website. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(3)(A)(ii)(4), 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(2) (2013). 
 159. Letter from Sen. Charles Schumer to Hon. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (May 10, 
2012). Flash Boys added its own criticism, declaring that “[t]he maker-taker system of fees and 
kickbacks used by all of the exchanges was simply a method for paying the big Wall Street 
banks to screw the investors whose interests they were meant to guard.” LEWIS, supra note 2, at 
168–69. 
 160. See William Alden, supra note 7. A recent New York Times editorial suggested that 
maker-taker fees are “corrupting” brokers, who “under the guise of making subjective 
judgments about best execution, . . . were routinely sending orders to venues that paid the 
highest rebates,” and concluded by calling for greater regulation or elimination of maker-taker 
fees. See Editorial, supra note 7 (using TD Ameritrade data from the fourth quarter of 2012). 
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launched against TD Ameritrade, alleging that it violated its duty of 
best execution in this way.161 
1. Modeling the fee structures.  To see how these fee structures 
work, we will start with a model that makes several simplifying 
assumptions. These assumptions are that the maker rebate and taker 
fee are the same and equal r, that there is a single, consolidated 
trading venue, that all traders (not just HFTs, the traders are in the 
business of liquidity supply) submit their orders directly to the trading 
venue rather than doing so through a broker, and that regular traders 
(that is, all traders except HFTs) are rational actors who are well 
informed about the terms of trade available in the market. Under 
these assumptions, maker-taker fees and rebates turn out to be 
entirely benign: they have no effect on how liquidity is supplied or on 
anyone’s wealth position. We will then go on to consider the 
consequences of relaxing these assumptions. 
a. Liquidity suppliers.  Let us look at things first from the 
liquidity suppliers’ point of view. These are HFTs, the entities in the 
competitive business of supplying liquidity through posting 
nonmarketable limit orders, as well as regular traders who post such 
orders in order to transact at better prices than they would get from 
marketable orders. Consider first the HFTs. Let S equal half of the 
spread HFTs need to cover their costs associated with making a 
market given the possibility of informed trading. Let P be the 
consensus value of a security at the time a quote is made. Absent a 
liquidity maker rebate, the limit orders posted by the HFTs at the 
trading venue will put the offer at P + S and the bid P – S.162 When 
there is rebate of R (R < S), the offer will be P + S – R. This is 
because an HFT will receive R every time a limit order it posted 
transacts, and so receiving P + S – R is, from an economic point of 
view, the equivalent to receiving P + S if there were no rebate (that is, 
the amount the HFT would need to receive to break even without a 
rebate). Under the same logic, the bid will be P – S + R, which is the 
economic equivalent for the HFT of paying the breakeven price of P 
– S per share in a world without rebates.163 Rational regular traders 
 
 161. See, e.g., Complaint at 20, Klein v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 14-cv-5738 
(D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014), 2014 WL 5018542. 
 162. See supra Part III.B. 
 163. For expository simplicity, the analysis assumes the tick size (the minimum difference 
allowed by the market between one price and the prices above and below) is infinitesimal, 
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who submit nonmarketable limit orders will set the limit that they 
specify so, relative to the limit they would have set in the absence of a 
rebate, they adjust a buy order limit down by R and a sell order up by 
R. 
b. Liquidity takers.  Now consider liquidity takers, that is, traders 
who submit marketable orders. On one hand, because of the 
adjustments to the available offers and bids described above, posted 
by liquidity suppliers in reaction to receiving rebates, the offer price 
which traders submitting marketable orders pay for shares, and the 
bid price at which they sell them, are each improved by R relative to 
what they would have paid or received in the no-rebate world, 
respectively. On the other hand, this narrowing of the spread is 
exactly offset by the fee R they must pay the venue for each share 
bought or sold. 
c. The benign effect of the fees and rebates given the simplifying 
assumptions.  This analysis shows that the combination of maker 
rebates and taker fees leads to precisely the same terms of trade from 
an economic point of view as would prevail in their absence. So there 
is no reason to think, at least under the assumptions we have 
employed so far, that anyone would behave differently than in a 
world without rebates. This same analysis holds for taker rebates and 
maker fees, because, if they are equal, they simply correspond to a 
negative R in the expressions above. 
2. Relaxing the assumptions of the model.  Consider what 
happens when we relax various assumptions of the model. 
a. Relaxing the assumptions about the trading venues.  Relaxing 
the simplifying assumptions we made about trading venues does not 
change the conclusions. We started with the assumption that the 
maker rebate and the taker fee are equal. In reality, they are not 
because the venue needs to be paid a fee for the service of providing a 
place to trade. This fee is the difference between the two.164 The size 
of the venue’s fee is irrelevant to the current discussion, and, with it 
 
whereas, pursuant to NMS Rule 612, for most stocks it is in fact a penny, but including this 
complication in the analysis leaves the conclusion largely unchanged.  
 164. The rebate paid to liquidity makers is generally smaller than the fee charged to the 
liquidity taker in the maker-taker structure, and the opposite in the taker-maker structure.  
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taken out, the maker rebate and taker fee are by definition always 
going to be equal. 
We also assumed a single, consolidated trading venue. The real 
world, with competing venues, should work the same way, however, 
at least as we continue to hold on to our assumptions about the 
nature of the traders in the market, because both liquidity suppliers 
and liquidity takers, when deciding whether to send an order to any 
given venue, can make the same calculations as in the model above 
that the venue’s fee and rebate system will affect bids and offers in a 
way that just offsets these fees and rebates. 
b. Relaxing the assumptions about regular traders.  The 
assumptions about traders may play a more critical role. To start, we 
assumed that regular traders send their orders directly to the market 
without broker intermediation. That means that in maker-taker 
venues, traders who submit nonmarketable limit orders would receive 
the rebate directly and those who submit marketable orders would 
pay the fee directly (and the reverse for taker-maker venues). In fact, 
few regular traders are allowed to send orders directly to trading 
venues; they must use a broker. So, for a regular trader, the broker is 
the one who receives the rebate and pays the fee. And typically, 
nothing in the trader’s contract with its broker provides that the 
rebates and fees be passed through directly to the trader,165 nor is this 
required by regulation. 
If we continue to assume competitive exchanges, a competitive 
market for brokerage services, and regular traders who are rational 
and sufficiently informed to be able to effectively monitor the quality 
of service their brokers are delivering, the effects of the maker-taker 
fee structure (and the taker-maker one) remain benign. As set out 
below, the maker rebates offered by a given venue will lead to 
commensurately lower brokerage fees for nonmarketable limit orders 
sent to this venue and the taker fees will lead to commensurately 
higher brokerage fees for marketable orders there. So the rebates and 
fees are simply passed on indirectly through their effects on 
brokerage fees. 
 
 165. High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Robert Battalio, 
Professor of Finance, University of Notre Dame). Interactive Brokers offers such a contract, but 
it also offers a fixed-price-for-execution contract. See Commissions: Stocks, ETFs and 
Warrants—Overview, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/?f=
commission [http://perma.cc/3KKK-WPUR].  
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Consider first a trader who wishes her broker to submit on her 
behalf a nonmarketable buy limit order. This buy order will be 
competing with bids posted by HFTs. Recall that each HFT will 
increase its bid price commensurately to the size of the rebate, if any, 
at the venue where it is posting its offer. The trader’s limit order, to 
have the same likelihood of timely execution as it would in a venue 
without a rebate, would need to have a commensurately higher limit 
price as well. If the trader’s limit order ultimately does transact, the 
cost of buying a share to the trader is her limit price plus Bnm, where 
Bnm is the broker’s commission for nonmarketable orders posted on 
that venue. If Cnm is the cost to the broker for the act of servicing a 
nonmarketable order, but the broker receives R as a rebate, then the 
broker’s net cost is Cnm – R. In a competitive brokerage market with 
informed consumers of the service, the forces of competition would 
assure that Bnm = Cnm – R, whatever R is at the venue. When R is 
higher, the trader will need to submit a commensurately higher limit 
price to get the same likelihood of timely execution, and so would 
need a commensurately lower brokerage fee to come out even. 
Now consider a trader who wishes its broker to submit on his 
behalf a marketable buy limit order. The price he will need to pay will 
be P + S + Bm, where Bm is the broker’s commission for 
nonmarketable orders posted on this venue. If Cm is the cost to the 
broker for the act of servicing a marketable order, and the broker 
must pay a taker fee of R as a rebate, the broker’s net cost is Cm + R. 
In a competitive brokerage market with informed consumers of the 
service, the forces of competition would assure that Bm = Cn + R, 
whatever R is. When R is lower, S will be commensurately higher, 
and so the brokerage fee will need to be lower for the trader to end 
up paying the same net price for a share.166 
This story, though, has two flaws, which raise, but do not prove, 
the possibility that rebates affect how players in the market behave. 
First, at least for most retail trades, brokerage fees are fixed on a per-
execution basis and do not depend on the venue in which a particular 
order transacts. Second, it is not so easy for a trader to monitor the 
performance of his broker. With brokerage commissions invariant to 
where an order is sent, a broker has an incentive to send a 
nonmarketable limit order to the venue with the highest maker rebate 
and marketable orders to the venue with the lowest taker fee. 
 
 166. Mirror images of these stories apply to nonmarketable and marketable sell orders. 
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This problem is potentially more acute with a nonmarketable 
limit order because determining whether or not it received best 
execution is more difficult to figure out than with marketable orders. 
The quality of a limit-order execution includes whether it executes or 
not, how long it takes to get executed, and how likely the market is to 
move in a disadvantageous direction following an execution. A recent 
paper sheds some light on this question.167 To take the extremes at the 
time of their data, Edge X had a rebate rate of $.0030 per share and 
provided a fill rate (partial or full) of 54 percent, an average fill speed 
of 111 seconds, and a good-fill ratio (measured as the proportion of 
time the midpoint of the market quotes five minutes after a 
transaction was above the transaction price at the bid or below the 
transaction price at the ask) of 49 percent. In contrast, Boston, with a 
rebate rate of -$.0014 per share had a fill rate of 74.5 percent, a fill 
speed of thirty-three seconds and a good-fill ratio of 55 percent. Four 
retail brokerage houses sent roughly half of their limit orders to Edge 
X and only Interactive Brokers spread its limit orders around.168 
Evidently, nonmarketable limit orders posted on high-rebate venues 
are not getting very good execution. Yet that is where many retail 
brokerages are sending nonmarketable limit orders when the 
customer does not specify a venue for execution. 
3. Wealth-transfer considerations.  Even if traders are unable to 
monitor the quality of broker execution completely, especially with 
regard to nonmarketable limit orders, the level of competition among 
trading venues and among brokers probably assures that neither type 
of enterprise is making excess returns as a result of the maker-taker 
and taker-maker rebate and fee structures that abound. In terms of 
traders, there appears to be excess liquidity on the maker-taker 
venues and this benefits large traders who place marketable orders 
there. Those who are harmed are the ordinary traders whose 
nonmarketable limit orders get inferior execution. Putting a cost on 
inferior execution is difficult. 
4. Efficiency considerations.  Extra liquidity of the kind that 
appears to be generated by venue rebates and fees may be valuable to 
 
 167. Robert Battalio, Shane Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It All? On the 
Relation Between Make-Take Fees & Limit Order Execution Quality 10 (Dec. 13, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www3.nd.edu/~scorwin/documents/BattalioCorwinJennings_20
131213_SSRN.pdf [http://perma.cc/83NY-JZ3A]. 
 168. Id. at 11. 
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informed traders and hence may add to share-price accuracy. The 
welfare effects of poor execution quality for traders placing 
nonmarketable limit orders are harder to trace through without a 
better sense than we have of who they are and what they are trying to 
accomplish. They too may be informed traders, or they may be 
uninformed traders who think they are informed. In any event, as 
with dark-pool misconduct, it is illegal for brokers not to provide best 
execution, which is an implicit term in their contracts with customers. 
Even if their failure to do so results in greater price accuracy, 
allowing this breach of an understanding between broker and 
customer does not seem the right way to increase share-price 
accuracy. 
G. Purchase of Order Flow 
Many brokers sell their order flow to “internalizers” such as 
Citadel and KCG Americas, which are trading venues that match 
incoming buy orders with nearly simultaneous incoming sell orders, 
buying from the sellers and selling to the buyers.169 The payments the 
brokers receive from the internalizers are referred to as “payment for 
order flow.”170 Internalizers typically only pay for marketable orders. 
They generally agree to provide the broker’s customers with nominal 
price improvement, with shares purchased from sell-order customers 
at perhaps $.0001 over the NBB and shares sold to buy-order 
customers at that amount below the NBO. Battalio and his coauthors 
show that nine out of the ten retail brokers studied send virtually all 
marketable orders to order-flow purchasers.171 
Payment for order flow has been heavily criticized as potentially 
“creat[ing] . . . conflicts of interest” between brokers, who seek to 
maximize revenue from selling order flow, and customers, who might 
receive better execution elsewhere.172 Indeed, in a letter to SEC Chair 
White, Senator Carl Levin stated that “[c]onflicts of interest erode 
public confidence in the markets” and that “payments [for order flow] 
create another incentive for brokers to maximize their own profits at 
 
 169. HARRIS, supra note 18, at 520–22 (defining and discussing internalization). 
 170. Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the “Payment for Order Flow” Problem, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2001). 
 171. Battalio et al., supra note 167, at 10. 
 172. High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8, at 33 (statement of Joseph P. Ratterman, 
CEO, BATS Global Markets); id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“‘[P]ayment for 
order flow,’ can add up to untold millions, and almost every retail broker keeps these payments 
rather than passing them on to clients”). 
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the expense of best execution of customer orders,” and should be 
eliminated.173 
1. Wealth effects.  If the internalizer and broker markets are each 
competitive, then the analysis of the wealth effects of payment for 
order flow is very simple. There are none. The internalizers pay the 
brokers what they are able to make above their costs (plus a market 
return on capital) from executing the buy and sell orders on the 
promised terms of slight price improvement. What the brokers 
receive reduces the costs of providing brokerage services and in a 
competitive brokerage market these savings are passed on through 
lower commissions. 
If, on the other hand, the internalization market is not 
competitive, then internalizers are the monopsonist equivalent of 
oligopolists and may have the market power to pay less for order flow 
than what they make above their costs (plus a market return on 
capital) from executing orders at a slight improvement over the NBO 
and NBB. What brokers then pass on to customers in the form of 
lower brokerage fees would be insufficient, leaving traders worse off. 
Alternatively, the internalization market may be competitive, but the 
broker market may not be. In that case, the brokers may sell the 
order flow for an appropriate price but only pass a portion of those 
savings on to customers. If so, then just like with maker-taker fees, 
payment for order flow could create a genuine agency problem by 
aligning brokers’ incentives with receiving payments for order flow, 
whereas better execution may be obtained on an exchange. In this 
noncompetitive version of the market, customers receive inferior 
execution because their orders are not routed to exchanges and only 
receive a portion of the savings obtained. 
2. Efficiency effects.  Liquidity suppliers on the exchange do not 
get the opportunity to interact with internalized order flow. This 
alters the adverse-selection environment on the exchange.174 By 
removing uninformed order flow from exchanges, the probability that 
liquidity providers face informed traders increases, thereby increasing 
the spread that fundamental-value traders need to pay. This, as we 
have seen, reduces their incentives to engage in this activity and thus 
reduces share-price accuracy. On the other hand, it is possible that 
 
 173. Letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC supra note 14. 
 174. See Haeberle, supra note 155, at 44–45. 
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execution at terms slightly better than NBO and NBB, when 
combined with lower brokerage fees resulting from the indirect 
passing on of at least part of the payment for order flow, reduces the 
effective cost of trading for uninformed traders. If so, the practice of 
brokers selling order flow to internalizers improves the efficiency 
with which resources are allocated over time and the efficiency with 
which risk is allocated. Still, for these efficiency gains to be fully 
realized, internalizers must pay competitive rebates for order flow, 
and these must be fully passed on to traders one way or another. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Potential regulatory responses, prompted by the preceding 
survey of controversial practices in the new stock market, fall into 
four groups. The first three controversial practices that we 
reviewed—electronic front running, slow-market arbitrage, and 
exploitation of dark pool midpoint orders—all involve HFTs 
acquiring information concerning newly executed transactions and 
changing their quotes ahead of others in the market. The next 
practice, the relation of HFTs to market volatility involves the entire 
market’s reliance on this form of liquidity supply. The next two 
practices relate to dark-pool operations and their investment-bank 
operators as brokers. And the last two involve payments to brokers 
relating to the customer orders they are handling. 
A. HFT Speed in Obtaining Market Information 
Because electronic front running, slow-market arbitrage, and 
exploitation of dark-pool-midpoint orders all involve HFTs acquiring 
market information ahead of others, once we have assessed the social 
desirability or undesirability of each of these practices, any possible 
reform will need to take account of its effect on all three. Below we 
will make such an assessment of each of these practices and then 
discuss possible reforms. 
1. Would it be desirable to eliminate electronic front running?  
Persons transacting in stocks have always played a cat-and-mouse 
game in which each tries to figure out what the others are doing. One 
function of regulation is to step in and prohibit particular 
informational advantages when such intervention can lead to 
improved social outcomes. The question is whether the informational 
advantages HFTs obtain from electronic front running call for such an 
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intervention. The first step to answering this question requires a 
policy analysis that compares a world with and without electronic 
front running. Based on what we know at the moment, the matter is 
too close to call, with considerations pointing in both directions. The 
unfairness case against electronic front running is weak. It is the 
efficiency case for and against the practice that is too close to call. 
a. Actual unfairness.  The rhetoric of the critics of electronic front 
running focuses primarily on what they see as the unfairness of the 
resulting wealth transfers.175 Deeper analysis, however, shows that a 
compelling case for the elimination of the practice cannot be made on 
this basis of perceived unfairness. As we have seen above, the 
practice actually appears to benefit ordinary people to the extent that 
they invest directly in the market as retail customers. The same is true 
to the extent that such ordinary people have channeled savings to 
mutual funds or pension funds that invest all or a portion of their 
funds in equities on an index basis and execute their purchase and 
sale transactions on exchanges. This is because retail investors are 
largely uninformed and index investing is by definition uninformed. 
The elimination of electronic front running would reduce liquidity, 
which, as we have seen, would make uninformed trading more 
expensive and the uninformed traders would enjoy no countervailing 
gain from the inability of market makers to detect transactions at 
other exchanges.176 To the extent that ordinary people invest through 
actively managed mutual and pension funds, which, by definition, 
seek to be informed traders, any net benefit that would arise from the 
practice’s elimination is, as discussed above, likely to be substantially 
 
 175. See supra notes 83–84. 
 176. It should be noted that a significant portion of retail marketable orders and index-
based institutional orders execute off exchanges in venues where the trades can be identified as 
largely uninformed. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 1, To Establish the Retail Price Improvement Program on a Pilot Basis until 
12 Months from the Date of Implementation, Exchange Act Release No. 68,937, at 17, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 12,397, 12,404 (Feb. 22, 2013); PREECE, supra note 140, at 3 (“Internalization is also 
thought to account for almost 100% of all retail marketable order flow.”). In a fully competitive 
market, the spreads associated with these trades should not include a significant adverse-
selection component. Thus, they should be unaffected by whether or not electronic front 
running occurs on the exchanges, when, in the absence of the practice, the spreads would be 
wider to reflect the greater risk that the HFTs are dealing with informed traders. In reality, 
however, the spreads are barely smaller in these off-exchange executions (that is, there is only a 
small amount of “price improvement”). As analyzed supra Part V.G, why this is the case will 
affect the conclusion of whether wider spreads on the exchange in fact are passed on to the 
retail customer.  
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captured by the persons running the funds in the form of the higher 
fees and salaries they would be able to command. 
b. Efficiency.  A stronger case can be made for the elimination of 
electronic front running on efficiency grounds. As at least our first-cut 
efficiency analysis of electronic front running shows, elimination of 
the practice would involve an unavoidable efficiency trade-off. There 
would be efficiency gains in the form of better capital allocation and 
utilization of the economy’s existing productive capacity, which would 
arise from increases in price accuracy.177 But there would be efficiency 
losses in the form of less-efficient allocation of resources over time 
and allocation of risk, which would arise from decreases in liquidity.178 
A priori, however, there is no obvious reason for choosing the point 
in this trade-off associated with the elimination of the practice over 
the point associated with the continuation of the practice. 
Also, our more nuanced analysis, which takes account of the 
presence of announcement-information traders and inside-
information traders, suggests it is quite possible that eliminating 
electronic front running would in fact reduce, rather than improve, 
price accuracy, so no trade-off occurs and the practice is 
unambiguously efficiency enhancing.179 
c. Resources consumed.  What is clear is that prohibiting 
electronic front running would save the very substantial human and 
material resources currently supporting the practice that would be 
freed up to be used elsewhere in the economy in some more clearly 
productive way. These savings suggest that if a reasonably cost 
effective way could be found to eliminate the practice and that no 
market forces are likely to take us to the same result in the 
foreseeable future, such regulation would be desirable, unless we 
 
 177. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 178. See supra Parts V.A.2 and V.A.3. 
 179. See supra Part V.A.4. It is worth noting, however, that the example of electronic front 
running we address deals with a market maker who defensively removes a quote when a 
transaction at another exchange is observed. It is possible to imagine an example in which the 
market maker removed its initial quote, and then posts an inferior quote against which an 
incoming order nonetheless transacts, because of a lack of quote competition at the top of the 
book. If this higher quote simply reflects the market maker seizing an opportunity to charge a 
higher price, then it is just a wealth transfer with no social benefits. In fact, the higher cost of 
trading can lead to a variety of negative effects. Conversely, if the higher price represented an 
upward adjustment in the quote for risk-management reasons, then our analysis might mirror 
that in the text above. 
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affirmatively believe the practice is efficiency enhancing on a net 
basis in terms of the factors discussed just above. 
d. Appearance of unfairness.  Although our analysis above 
suggests that electronic front running does not actually result in 
unfairness, HFT practices of this sort are clearly viewed by a 
substantial portion of the public as being unfair.180 Much of this 
perception is of course due to the very criticism of HFT practices that 
this Article seeks to subject to more serious analysis. Normally, the 
better response to misunderstanding is education, not a change in 
what people are allowed to do when the activity does not in fact pose 
a problem. Still, this perception of unfairness may be very hard to 
eradicate. If one were persuaded that an efficiency analysis leans 
toward the conclusion that the practice is on balance socially 
undesirable, the existence of an unfounded but persistent sense of 
unfairness can add to the desirability of its prohibition. Such a 
perception of unfairness is demoralizing: it simply makes people feel 
bad to think that a major social institution is corrupt. It also 
discourages direct and indirect ownership of equities by persons who, 
absent having this sense that something unfair was going on, would 
find equities to be an investment vehicle that suits some of their 
needs. 
2. Adding slow-market arbitrage and dark-pool-midpoint-order 
exploitation to the analysis.  There are presumably large synergies in 
terms of the use of real productive resources between electronic front 
running, slow-market arbitrage, and dark-pool-midpoint-order 
exploitation. So resource use is not an independent consideration 
with regard to these other two speed-based HFT practices. Still, these 
two practices each seem unquestionably undesirable. 
No fairness argument can be made that slow-market arbitrage 
helps any ordinary investors: it hurts all regular traders, uninformed 
and informed alike, by increasing their effective cost of trading.181 
And because of this, its economic welfare effects are unambiguously 
negative as well.182 The increased effective cost of trading for 
informed traders means that it is less rewarding to seek out bits of 
publicly available information and to analyze their implications in a 
 
 180. See supra notes 83–84. 
 181. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 182. See supra Part V.A.3. 
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sophisticated way. As a consequence, share-price accuracy, with its 
beneficial effects on the real economy, is reduced. The increased 
effective cost of trading on uninformed traders has negative effects on 
the efficient allocation of resources over time and on the efficient 
allocation of risk. 
For slow-market arbitrage to occur, however, the same HFT 
must have posted a quote that is at the top of the book of an 
exchange; discover that the best quote available for that stock 
nationally has changed; an order must transact against the HFT’s 
now-stale quote; and the HFT must be able to transact against the 
new best quote before anyone else can. This seems like it would be an 
unusual circumstance, although it is worth further empirical study. 
Dark-pool-midpoint-order exploitation hurts uninformed 
investors and in so doing again has negative effects on the efficient 
allocation of resources over time and on the efficient allocation of 
risk.183 It arguably helps share-price efficiency by deterring 
uninformed traders from using dark pools so they use exchanges 
instead, thereby causing spreads to lower and reducing the effective 
cost of trading for fundamental-value-informed traders. But if it is in 
fact good social policy to push uninformed traders into the market to 
subsidize such informed trading, other methods could be utilized to 
accomplish this goal more directly, such as prohibiting or limiting the 
use of dark pools. 
The policies and procedures of the trading venue IEX illustrate 
the possibility that private-market solutions can midpoint-order 
exploitation without the need for regulatory intervention. IEX 
imposes a 350-microsecond delay before transactions can be placed 
through its matching engine during which it utilizes private-data feeds 
from all exchanges to check whether the midpoint of the best 
available quotes has changed and thus ensure that a midpoint order is 
not executing at a stale NBO or NBB.184 The inducement for dark 
pools to implement such reforms is that traders would find the 
reformed venues more attractive places to send their orders. 
 
 183. See supra Part V.C.2. 
 184. IEX True Price™ Matching Engine, IEX TRADING, http://www.iextrading.com/trading/
trueprice [http://perma.cc/DTN2-NYEF]. A representative of Goldman Sachs has also said that 
there is significant client pressure for Goldman to ensure its dark pool has access to private data 
feeds from exchanges. See 2015 Workshops: The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 
COLUM. L. SCH. (May 14, 2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/capital-markets/previous-work
shops/2015 [http://perma.cc/67WP-PL4Q]. 
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3. Measures to prevent electronic front running and other speed-
based practices.  When we combine our ambivalence concerning 
electronic front running with our clear negative evaluation of slow-
market arbitrage and midpoint-order exploitation, and add in the 
substantial resources that HFTs consume undertaking these three 
practices, we lean toward favoring reforms that would eliminate HFT 
advantages in obtaining information ahead of others in the market, if 
such a reform were relatively low cost. The recent controversy 
surrounding HFTs—and electronic front running in particular—has 
resulted in a spate of proposals for addressing their activity, which 
offer a range of potential benefits and costs. 
Two proposals address HFT activity in general by taking aim at 
high-frequency quoting activity.185 The first provides financial 
disincentives for high-volume quoting, such as NYSE Euronext’s 
recent surcharge on each order above a 100:1 order-to-trade ratio.186 
These fees may simply be a sensible response to HFTs externalizing 
the cost of bandwidth use. Things get more complicated, however, if 
the fees are higher than what is necessary to tax this externality and 
are aimed at reducing practices such as electronic front running. 
HFTs revise quotes for many reasons other than information they 
learn from electronic front running and, assuming HFTs are often 
revising quotes above the 100:1 rate, then fees on quotes in numbers 
exceeding this limit would create disincentives for all such revisions. 
Thus, they can be expected to widen spreads and reduce depth 
because they make it harder for market makers to control adverse-
selection and inventory risks through their quoting strategies.187 That 
is not a concern if these fees are imposed by an exchange in active 
competition with other exchanges: customers can decide whether they 
like the trade-offs implied by the ultimate results. But it would be a 
concern if mandated by regulation as a way to stop electronic front 
running. 
A second proposal regarding HFT conduct would impose a 
minimum time in force for quotes, prohibiting them from being 
canceled, within, for example, 100 milliseconds of submission.188 
Again, HFTs cancel orders faster than 100 milliseconds for reasons 
other than electronic front running. The costs of such a plan in terms 
 
 185. See Jones, supra note 98, at 42–51. 
 186. Id. at 45. 
 187. Id. at 46. 
 188. Id. at 47. 
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of liquidity provision could be substantial. It sets a floor on the length 
of the option offered by liquidity providers to liquidity takers, 
increasing their chance of being adversely selected and so widening 
spreads.189 
Another much-discussed proposal involves altering the current 
market-trading structure.190 Stock exchanges currently conduct 
continuous two-sided (that is buy and sell) auctions for each security. 
A recent proposal, endorsed by New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman,191 is to replace this with frequent batch auctions, say, 
every 100 milliseconds. Batch auctions would consist of uniform-
price, sealed-bid auctions conducted at discrete time intervals. 
Echoing our own concerns about electronic front running, the 
proposal argues that the current structure permits frequent technical 
arbitrage opportunities based on speed, creating a socially wasteful 
arms race to exploit these opportunities.192 Frequent batch auctions 
would eliminate the value of minute speed advantages. Though the 
proposal may have significant merit, much would depend on 
implementation. To eliminate electronic front running, every 
exchange would need to have its auction (nearly) simultaneously. If 
auctions were sufficiently frequent and at different times at each 
exchange, then intraexchange exploitation of tiny speed differences 
might persist, including electronic front running. 
We think an approach to ending HFT information speed 
advantages exists that is simpler both in terms of implementation and 
in terms of achieving the needed legal changes. None of these three 
practices would be possible if private data feeds did not make market 
quote and transaction data effectively available to some market 
participants before others. Thus, one potential regulatory response to 
the problem posed by HFT activity is to require that private 
dissemination of quote and trade information be delayed until the 
exclusive processor under the Regulation NMS scheme, referred to as 
the “SIP,” has publicly disseminated information from all exchanges. 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton & John J. Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms 
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response 6 (Chicago Booth Research, Paper 
No. 14-03, Feb. 17, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388265 [http://perma.cc/937M-8KLE]. 
 191. See Linette Lopez, New York Attorney General Endorses A Radical Change To The 
Way The World Trades Stocks, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/schneiderman-endorses-batch-auctions-2014-3 [http://perma.cc/2KC3-8Q
7J]. 
 192. Budish et al., supra note 190, at 12–20. 
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Rule 603(a)(2) of Regulation NMS prohibits exchanges from 
“unreasonably discriminatory” distribution of market data.193 In its 
adopting release for Regulation NMS, the SEC outlined its 
interpretation of that provision, which is that privately “distributed 
data could not be made available on a more timely basis [to private 
clients] than core data is made available to a Network processor [the 
SIP]. . . . Rule 603(a) prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer from 
transmitting data to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the 
data to a Network processor.”194 Core data is composed of last-trade 
reports and each exchange’s current highest bids and lowest offers for 
each security, from which its NBB and NBO is ascertained.195 
This interpretation of the “unreasonably discriminatory” 
distribution language of Rule 603(a)(2) appears to say that it is 
permissible for core-data information to reach an HFT more rapidly 
than the public recipients of the SIP as long as the signal sending the 
data to the HFT did not precede the signal sent to the SIP. The 
exchanges and the HFTs, in agreeing to their co-location 
arrangements, have assumed this interpretation to be correct. The 
SEC, in its choice of enforcement actions, has confirmed this 
interpretation as well. No actions have been brought against co-
location arrangements in which the signal sent to HFTs did not 
precede the signal sent to the SIP. Indeed, the SEC, in a 2010 
Concept Release, acknowledged the existence of exchanges’ widely 
known practice of submitting data simultaneously to the SIP and 
private feeds and that, as a result, private feeds will reach subscribers 
far faster than the SIP distributes its data.196 In a 2012 proceeding, 
however, the SEC found that the NYSE had been sending market 
data, including best bids and offers, to private subscribers before it 
sent that data to the SIP, and fined NYSE $5 million.197 
 
 193. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2) (2015). Section 11A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes 
the Commission to regulate market data. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(b) (2012). 
 194. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 & 37,569 (June 29, 2005) (adopting 
the release). 
 195. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.601, 242.602 (2015) (requiring exchanges to report last sales—
price and size of the most recent trades—and current best bids and offers); NetCoalition v. SEC, 
615 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the core data regime). 
 196. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3601 (Jan. 21, 2010) (discussing how the consolidation processing 
time of the SIP “means that [private] data feeds can reach end-users faster than the 
consolidated data feeds.”). 
 197. See New York Stock Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,857, 2012 WL 
4044880, *1–3, *12 (Sept. 14, 2012). 
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The language of Rule 603(a)(2) could plausibly be interpreted in 
a contrary fashion: sending the signal simultaneously to an HFT and 
to the SIP arguably is an “unreasonably discriminatory” distribution 
of core data to the end users given that it is predictable that some will 
consistently receive it faster than others. This interpretation of Rule 
603(a)(2)’s language already has its advocates. The market research 
firm Nanex has repeatedly insisted that the exchanges are in standing 
violation of Regulation NMS for this reason.198 Interestingly, this 
focus on the time at which information reaches end users rather than 
the time of a public announcement is the approach the courts and the 
SEC have traditionally taken with respect to when, for purposes of 
the regulation of insider trading, information is no longer nonpublic.199 
Thus the SEC’s ability to alter its interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2) 
may be the path of least legislative or regulatory resistance to 
prohibiting electronic front running. One may feel, however, that too 
much has already been invested in reliance on the SEC’s apparent 
original interpretation for a prohibition to be imposed without the 
normal procedures of an administrative-agency rule change. If so, 
then that process can be followed and the rule amended. 
B. HFTs and Volatility 
Overall, we concluded that no evidence exists of a relationship 
between HFT activities and general increases in market volatility.200 
We conclude as well that the connection between HFTs and episodic 
volatility is not due to predatory behavior on their parts, but rather 
their rational withdrawal from the market at certain moments of 
stress.201 
Nonetheless, a number of existing proposals seek to address the 
alleged link between HFT activity and volatility. These proposals fall 
into two groups: one group seeks to ameliorate trading volatility 
generally and would incidentally affect HFTs; the second group seeks 
to target a specific link between HFTs and volatility. 
 
 198. See Direct vs. SIP Data Feed, NANEX (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4599.
html [http://perma.cc/SY69-GKTS]; HFT Front Running, All The Time, NANEX (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4442.html [http://perma.cc/7XJE-KCU2]. 
 199. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968); Investors Mgmt. 
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9207, 1971 WL 120502, at *8 (July 29, 1971). 
 200. See supra Part V.D.1. 
 201. See supra Part V.D.2. 
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Consider the first group. Soon after the Flash Crash, the SEC 
phased in single-stock circuit breakers, which impose a five-minute 
trading halt if the price of a specific stock moves by more than 10 
percent within five minutes.202 This trading pause is designed to give 
liquidity providers breathing room to consider whether order 
imbalances actually reflect information or not.203 Similarly, the SEC 
has also approved a “limit up-limit down” plan that pauses trading in 
a stock if transactions move more than a certain amount, often 5 
percent, away from the security’s average price over the last five 
minutes.204 These are moderate proposals, which should have salutary 
effects in moderating future crashes. 
The second set of proposals tackle the important question of 
whether market makers, however they be defined, should have 
stronger affirmative liquidity-providing obligations than they 
currently do. In the wake of the Flash Crash, exchanges have already 
imposed a range of affirmative obligations on institutionally identified 
market makers at their venues. For instance, the NYSE has 
“designated market makers,” who have specific obligations to help 
maintain an orderly and continuous trading market in particular 
stocks.205 Some commentators want to go further down this road and 
to impose on HFTs legal responsibilities resembling those imposed on 
the institutionally designated market makers of yesteryear, such as 
the specialists of the pre-2005 NYSE.206 
There is an obvious attraction to proposals that might moderate 
the flight of liquidity provision from the market during periods of 
extreme volatility. The historical evidence, however, suggests that 
 
 202. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA 
Rule 6121, Exchange Act Release No. 62,251, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,183, 34,184 (June 10, 2010); Order 
Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Trading Pauses Due to 
Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No. 62,252, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,186, 34,187 
(June 10, 2010). 
 203. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA 
Rule 6121, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,186; Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule 
Changes Relating to Trading Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility, 75 Fed. Reg. 
34,189. 
 204. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan to Address 
Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No. 67,091, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,498, 33,499, 
33,501 n.36 (May 31, 2012). 
 205. See NYSE, DESIGNATED MARKET MAKERS (2014), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/
nyse/markets/nyse/designated_market_makers.pdf [http://perma.cc/5346-RB9K]. 
 206. KHALDOUN KHASHANAH, IONUT FLORESCU & STEVE YANG, IRRC INST., ON THE 
IMPACT AND FUTURE OF HFT 14–17 (2014), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/HFT-Academic-White-
Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/25DN-JPEB]. 
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strong paper obligations have proved insufficient in the past to 
motivate market makers to continue supplying liquidity during 
periods of extreme volatility.207 Commentators have also noted 
problems with strengthening such affirmative obligations, 
emphasizing that any system that requires liquidity providers to take 
heavy losses during periods of extreme adverse selection must 
compensate them for doing so at other times. At least two other 
problems result: first, determining the value of that compensation is 
extremely difficult, and second, during times of crisis these designated 
liquidity providers will be the prime targets of informed traders.208 
Thus, we are skeptical about such proposals, especially given our 
conclusion that the consequences of episodic volatility in terms of 
wealth transfer and efficiency are not substantial.209 
C. Dark Pools 
We examined two practices associated with an investment bank 
playing the dual roles of a broker for customers’ orders and as an 
operator of a dark pool. The first potential problem concerns brokers 
directing customer orders to their own dark pools even when the 
customer receives inferior execution there. The second concerns 
brokers ignoring client instructions to direct an order to a specific 
venue and instead routing it to the broker’s own dark pool. 
A series of regulatory proposals that seek to rein in the growth of 
dark-pool volume generally could affect these two practices, but with 
the added and potentially undesirable effects of affecting access to 
dark-pool trading in general. These proposals include: eliminating 
retail investors’ access to dark pools and reserving them solely for 
institutional investors;210 requiring that dark pools offer price 
 
 207. See Jones, supra note 98, at 13–11, 38 (“While some observers suggested greater 
obligations for market-makers, experience in other rapid downdrafts, including the stock 
market crash of October 1987, when Nasdaq market-makers and others refused to answer their 
phones or provide market-making activity, indicates that market-makers will almost always 
choose to withdraw from the market in the face of such extreme volatility.”); see also Ian 
Domowitz, Take Heed The Lessons From The 1962 Flash Crash, INFORMATIONWEEK: 
WALLSTREET & TECH. (June 21, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/exchanges/
take-heed-the-lessons-from-the-1962-flash-crash/a/d-id/1263651? [http://perma.cc/P23Q-56JT] 
(discussing liquidity problems during a prior flash crash). 
 208. See Angel et al., supra note 29, at 33. 
 209. See supra Parts V.D.3, V.D.4. 
 210. See Philip Stafford, HK Plans Retail Investor Dark Pool Ban, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014, 
11:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32ab7298-9fba-11e3-94f3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3I1I
B1vhn [http://perma.cc/D4AX-CS3W]. 
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improvement before an order can be routed to one;211 and caps for the 
volume that can transact on dark venues.212 All of these proposals 
seem insufficiently targeted, however, if the problems with dark pools 
are solely the potential conflicts of interest noted above, rather than 
more fundamental features. 
More targeted and less intrusive would be a reform proposal 
focused on disclosure, designed to assist customers in determining 
whether their orders are being routed to venues offering best 
execution and whether order-routing directions are being ignored. 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has recently 
taken steps in the direction of greater disclosure, requesting comment 
on several new proposed rules.213 The most relevant proposal would 
require dark pools to provide FINRA with more extensive order-
book information than they currently provide to the Order Audit 
Trail System (OATS).214 OATS is an order-tracking system designed 
to assist FINRA’s surveillance activities.215 Also, brokers could be 
required to disclose what percentage of orders routed to their venue 
were executed there, at what price, and what instructions, if any, were 
associated with those orders. Economist James Angel, for example, 
has called for greater disclosure by brokers, suggesting that 
“brokerage firms themselves . . . disclose execution quality directly to 
their customers.”216  
 
 211. See Nicole Bullock, Financial Regulators Probe Dark Pools, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2014, 
12:07 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50428000-220d-11e4-9d4a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3F
U6kj2LE [http://perma.cc/EM92-86BS]. 
 212. See Philip Stafford & Alex Baker, Europe Deal Will Cap ‘Dark Pools’ Trading, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac3ce0f8-52ce-11e3-8586-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3CAa8BKBz [http://perma.cc/K4LB-DXXS]. 
 213. Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FINRA (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.
finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/CommunicationstoFirms/P600807 [http://perma.cc/JN
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reported by the ATS to the Order Audit Trail System (OATS), with such information to be 
reported to FINRA using existing OATS interfaces.”).  
 215. See generally ORDER AUDIT TRAIL SYSTEM (OATS) OATS BASICS, FINRA, http://
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/AppSupportDoc/p016184.pptx [http://perma.cc/TB65-TYPP]. 
 216. Role of Regulation Hearings, supra note 13, at 55 (statement of James J. Angel, 
Associate Professor, Georgetown University McDonough School of Business). Several other 
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Certainly, more could be done to strengthen the stock market’s 
mandatory disclosure regime. Currently, brokers are not required to 
disclose to customers on their transaction confirmation slips the 
venue in which an order was executed.217 The cost of requiring 
disclosure of execution venue should not be taxing, as records of 
where execution occurred must already be retained. Such disclosures 
would provide customers with the ability to check whether their 
requests were being followed. 
Proposals based on disclosure, however, share at least two 
vulnerabilities. First, if brokers are submitting inaccurate disclosures, 
then the SEC or private litigants must feasibly be able to reveal such 
conduct. Second, disclosure to customers will only be effective if 
customers are in fact examining and acting on those disclosures, 
which may not be the case. In an effort to mitigate this problem, the 
SEC could conduct periodic audits to verify whether routing was 
being accurately completed. 
D. Payments to Brokers in Connection With Customer Orders 
The last two controversial practices we considered were maker-
taker/taker-maker fees and payment for order flow. Each raises 
principal-agent problems between traders and their brokers. 
With regard to maker-taker and taker-maker fees, we saw that 
with different venues providing different rebates and charging 
different fees—something we observe in the real world—if brokerage 
commissions do not vary depending on the venue to which an order is 
sent, which again in the real world they do not, the broker has an 
incentive to send nonmarketable limit orders to the venue with the 
highest rebate and marketable orders to the venue with the lowest 
fee.218 In each case, the venue to which the order is sent will probably 
not provide best execution, a proposition for which there is, as we 
have seen, some empirical evidence. If customers were perfect 
monitors of their brokers, this incentive might not matter, but they 
 
update Rules 605 and 606 to increase ATS reporting); id. at 23 (statement of Tom Wittman, 
Executive Vice President and Global Head of Equities, NASDAQ OMX) (recommending that 
brokerage firms should disclose execution quality directly to customers). 
 217. Brokers do have limited disclosure requirements under Regulation NMS. Rule 605 
requires trading venues to provide monthly reports with various measures of execution quality, 
and Rule 606 requires broker-dealers that route customer orders to provide quarterly reports 
that identify at an aggregate level the venues where client orders are executed. See 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 242.605–242.606 (2015). 
 218. See supra Part V.F.2. 
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are not perfect monitors, especially with respect to limit orders. This 
leads us to the conclusion that rebates should be passed directly 
through to customers and fees charged to them, each independent of 
whatever commission the broker chooses to charge. Such a reform 
would not guarantee best execution, but it would eliminate an 
incentive for poor execution. 
With regard to payment for order flow, if the market for 
internalization services and for brokerage services are both 
sufficiently competitive, internalization with payment for order flow 
promises retail market order traders as low an effective cost of 
trading, when brokerage commissions are counted as part of the 
calculation, as they are going to be able to get. 
If one or both of the markets is not fully competitive, however, 
the practice leads to these traders having higher effective costs of 
trading than could be achieved by some other arrangement. 
Remember that we are looking at a situation in which brokers have 
the ability to segregate out retail order flow, which is uninformed, and 
match buyers and sellers without the adverse-selection concerns that 
generate much of the spread on exchanges. So the cost of execution 
should be very low. Indeed, it is even possible that these traders 
would be better off if all their trades would be sent to the exchanges, 
because now the execution of retail market orders execute at prices 
only slightly better than the NBB or NBO on exchanges that are 
deprived of internalized order flow. If they had this additional 
uninformed order flow, the NBB and NBO would be lower. 
The key question is whether brokers pass on to customers the 
substantial payments they receive for order flow in the form of lower 
commissions given that internalizers only offer nominal price 
improvement. We do not know the answer to this question, and it is 
certainly possible that it happens. Still, passing through the payments 
would solve the problem, if it were a problem. Such a reform should 
also not be very costly. In essence, this appears to be a situation in 
which the cure is sufficiently cheap that “if it might be broke, fix it.”  
CONCLUSION 
Over the last two decades, the stock market has been completely 
transformed. Driven by regulatory change and the information-
technology revolution, the structure of the market, the behavior of its 
participants, and the character of liquidity provision have all 
undergone dramatic and highly controversial changes. This Article 
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015  1:17 PM 
2015] THE NEW STOCK MARKET 277 
provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the new 
stock market and the social impact of the activities occurring within it. 
We demonstrate the utility of this framework by applying it to eight 
of the new market’s most controversial practices. These practices—
which include activities of high-frequency traders such as electronic 
front running, the behavior of dark-pool operators, and payments by 
trading venues to brokers in return for sending their customer 
orders—may seem completely unrelated to each other, but we show 
that they can all be understood through just three basic mechanisms: 
adverse selection, the principal-agent problem, and a multivenue 
trading system. 
We come to a number of conclusions concerning the proposals 
for reform. We agree, for example, with recommendations that 
brokers should be required to pass through maker-taker fees and 
payment for order flow to their customers. We disagree, for example, 
with proposals that HFTs must keep their quotes in force for some 
minimum amount of time and proposals aimed at generally 
discouraging, or even banning, trading on dark pools. These are bad 
ideas that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the market 
really works or of the actual social impact of a given practice. Yet 
other proposed reforms involve a trade-off in which an improvement 
in terms of one worthwhile social goal can only come at a sacrifice of 
another such goal. In these cases, it may not be obvious whether a 
reform is, or is not, desirable, but our framework allows for a better 
understanding of the trade-off involved, makes for a more informed 
choice, and may point to where further empirical research would be 
useful. We find this to be the case with, for example, proposals to 
briefly delay providing HFTs with information concerning new 
transactions and quotation changes, so HFTs have no advantages 
over other traders. 
In many ways, this Article is just a beginning. As the new stock 
market continues to evolve, issues arising out of it will not be in short 
supply. For example questions about whether the minimum stock-
price differential (“tick size”) should be larger than the current one 
cent and accusations that HFTs are sending in and cancelling quotes 
at a high rate of speed simply to clog the system are each issues that 
have been recently getting increasing attention. Surely many other 
issues will soon be coming at us from over the horizon. Thus, the 
framework developed here should have continued utility for some 
time to come. 
 
